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I. Introduction
As soon as men decide that all means are permitted to fight evil, then
their good becomes indistinguishable from the evil they set out to
destroy.'
1.1 Talk of Torture
In 1988, famous civil libertarian and Harvard law professor Alan
Dershowitz went to Israel. During his visit, Dershowitz argued for the
legalization of torture in cases that involved suspected terrorists..2 Other
than the Israeli government, no one paid much attention.
1 CHRISTOPHER DAWSON, THE JUDGMENT OF THE NATIONS (Sheed & Ward eds.,
1942).
2 Ken Gewertz, Balancing Act: Civil Liberties and Security, HARVARD
UNIVERSITY GAZETTE, Dec. 13, 2001, available at http://www.news.harvard.
edu/gazette/2001/12.13/17-dershowitz.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2005) ("First
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On September 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked four commercial
airplanes, killing nearly 3,000 American civilians. As expected, the
United States government promised to act immediately to prevent similar
attacks in the future. A week after the WTC/Pentagon attacks Congress
passed a Joint Resolution3 authorizing President Bush to
use all necessary and appropriate force against
those nations, organizations, or person he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored
such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any
future acts of international terrorism against the United
4States by such nations, organizations or persons.
Because the Joint Resolution gives the President broad
discretionary power to determine what acts constitute "international
terrorism," critics feared the President would use the Joint Resolution as
a pretext to curtail civil liberties at home and to strike at any state,
organization, or individual whose political or economic policies are an
interest to or at odds with the United States. They also expressed
concern that the administration would attempt to justify any questionable
conduct simply by labeling or characterizing the opponent as a
"terrorists."
In October 2001, Congress passed the USA Patriot Act.5
Arguably the largest legislative curtailment of civil rights in recent
proposed on a visit to Israel in 1988, Dershowitz intended the idea as a way of
reducing torture, not legitimizing it. He suggested that such warrants should be
issued only in a 'ticking bomb case,' situations in which the divulging of
information by a suspect would save innocent lives.").
3 A Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces
Against Those Responsible for the Recent Attacks Launched Against the United
States, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 107_congpublic_
laws&docid-f:publ040.107.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2005) [hereinafter Joint
Resolution].
4 Id. at § 2(a). See also 50 U.S.C. 1541.
5 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT) Act, Pub. L. No. 107-
56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname- 107_congpubliclaws&docid=f:publO56.107.pdf (last
visited Feb. 25, 2005).
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American history, the Patriot Act gives the President and law
enforcement officers unprecedented power to "arrest suspects and detain
them almost indefinitely, deport them, hold them in solitary confinement,
open their mail, tap their phones, monitor their e-mails and search their
homes without a warrant.",6 Although the Patriot Act expressly prohibits
the practice of targeting (that is, profiling) all Arab-Muslims currently
residing in the U.S., official statistics tell a wholly different story.
Some 1,200 foreigners have been secretly arrested,
and more than 600 are still in prison, although no court has
found them guilty. Many have been denied access to
lawyers. The US government has also announced its
intention to interrogate 5,000 men between [the ages of] 16
and 45, currently in the US on tourist visas, who are
regarded suspect just because they come from the Middle
East.7
6 Ignacio Ramonet, Farewell Liberty, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE (Ed Emery
trans., Jan. 2002), at http://mondediplo.com/2002/01/01farewell (last visited
Feb. 25, 2005). See World Socialist Web Site (WSWS) Editorial Board, One
Year Since September 11: An Unprecedented Assault on Democratic Rights
(Sept. 11, 2002), at http://www.wsws.org/articles/2002/sep2002/demo-
sl I_prn.shtml (last visited Feb. 17, 2005) [hereinafter WSWS, One Year Since
September 11], for the contention that the Patriot Act "expanded police powers
against the population as a whole, giving the FBI far greater leeway to tap
phones and electronic communication," and that under the Patriot Act, "schools
are once again required to turn over student records, which had been made
confidential in 1974 in response to revelations of FBI spying on anti-war
protestors." Additionally, "Libraries must turn over lending records for anyone
the FBI claims is a terrorist suspects. Agents can also demand 'business
records,' including newspaper subscription lists, bookstore receipts and even
journalists' unpublished notes and photographs." Id Not even attorneys, experts
in field of law, are exempt from additional intrusion. Agents may monitor
confidential or privileged conversations between lawyers and their clients, if
there is "'reasonable suspicion' that the conversation could touch on terrorism."
Id. (emphasis added).
7 Ramonet, supra note 6; see also WSWS, One Year Since September 11, supra
note 6 (stating that the Patriot Act "left immigrants with little or no rights-
subject to exclusion based on their political views, expulsion on the grounds on
legal political association, and detention on no more than the say-so of a federal
agent").
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On November 13, 2001, President Bush announced his intention
to create a new military tribunal with special procedures for those
8accused of terrorism. According to one source:
Trials will be held in secret; they can be held on ships or
at military bases; sentence will be passed by a board of
military officers; a full majority is not required to
impose the death sentence; there will be no appeal
against sentencing; conversations between defendants
and their lawyers can be monitored; the proceedings of
these tribunals will be covered by rules of confidentiality
and details will only be available to the public decades
later.9
There is also evidence that some terror suspects are being
deported, extradited, or held on foreign shores because "prisoners are
subject to the law of the land where they're detained, which could permit
more severe treatment than would be allowed under U.S. law."' 0
It was also during the months that followed the September 11 th
attacks that Professor Dershowitz began to refine and restate his case for
the legalization of torture." The only difference between Dershowitz's
earlier proposal to the Israeli government and his current one is that now
everyone is paying attention. A Christian Science Monitor/TIPP poll
8 President Bush also reversed Section 2.11 of Executive Order 12,333, which
expressly prohibits the assassination of foreign political leaders. See Exec. Order
No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981), 3 C.F.R. p. 200 (1982,
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eol2333.htm (last visited Feb. 25,
2005).
9 Ramonet, supra note 6.
10 Andrew Chang, Is Torture a Tool in the War on Terror? Has the War on
Terror Changed Attitudes on Torture?, Aug. 13, 2002, at
http://abcnews.go.com/Intemational/story?id=79885&page=l (last visited Feb.
17, 2005). For example, Syrian-born German citizen Mohammed Haydar
Zammar was arrested in Morocco in June 2002; he was allegedly sent back to
Syria solely because of the country's infamous human rights record. Id. See
also Ramonet, supra note 6 (stating "FBI officials have even gone so far as to
suggest that defendants be extradited to friendly countries with dictatorial
regimes, to be interrogated by police with methods that are crude but effective.")
(internal citation omitted).
"1 James M. Capozzola, Alan Dershowitz: Off the Deep End, Sept. 9, 2002, at
http://www.antiwar.com/ orig/capozzolal.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2005).
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taken in November 2001 arguably captures the shift of mainstream
Americans' attitude on issue, concluding that roughly one-third of
Americans would support government-sanctioned torture of terror
suspects being held in the United States or abroad. 2
That there seems to be a growing number of people who believe
that torture should be legalized, that the use of torture is an appropriate
instrument for the purposes of gathering information to prevent future
terrorists attacks, and that these "new" supporters of torture are citizens
of United States-the global superpower that has long advocated the
barbarity and unconstitutionality of torture-is cause for concern.
1.2 Why it Matters?
The legalization of torture as a means to an end has broad
domestic and international legal implications. If the United States were
to legalize torture, it would be expressly condoning the use of torture not
only at home but also abroad. This, coupled with the fact that torture is
already a "widespread and persistent"'13 problem in many states, would
(illegally) set forth a new international norm in direct contradiction to the
pre-existing norm prohibiting such acts. Victims of torture would be at
the mercy of their state because there would be no international violation,
thus no legal reason for another state to interfere.
Assuming arguendo that international terrorism is on the rise and
the lives of innocent civilians are at risk, does it necessarily follow that
states must abandon their basic obligations under international law to
protect their citizens from human rights violations, such as torture, on the
grounds of national security? If so, where do we draw the line? If a state
12 Abraham McLaughlin, How Far Americans Would go to Fight Terror,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, at http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/1114/pls3-
usju.html (last visited on Feb. 17, 2005) ("One in [three] could accept
government-sanctioned torture of suspects. One in [four] could envision a
scenario in which they'd back use of nuclear weapons."). See also Ramonet,
supra note 6 ("The use of torture has been openly called for in the mainstream
press. Speaking on CNN, Republican commentator Tucker Carlson was
explicit: Torture [is] not good, but terrorism [is] worse, so in certain
circumstances torture [is] the lesser evil. Steve Chapman, writing in Chicago
Tribune, pointed out that an apparently democratic state such as Israel had no
hesitation in using torture on 85% of its Palestinian prisoners.") (internal
citations omitted).
13 Mark Weisburd, International Human Rights in Practice--Customary
International Law and Torture: The Case of India, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 81, 82
(2001).
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professes that it is democratic or that it places a high value on human life
or humanity in general (as most states in the world profess, even if it is
pure rhetoric), then must not that state concede that this self-imposed
definition of what it is thereby limits what it may or may not do? In
other words, is torture ever legal under international law? A related
question that demands equal attention is whether the practice of torture
should be prohibited as a violationjus cogens norms under international
law.
1.3 General Purpose, Content & Structure of Paper
The purpose of this paper is to expose its readers to the major
legal and moral issues at the heart of the debate surrounding the legality
of torture as a means to deter terrorism. It is the author's contention that,
despite any one state's temporary objection to the prohibition, the
practice of torture is (and should be) a violation of customary
international law in general andjus cogens norms specifically. Part II of
this paper briefly examines the historical evolution of the practice of
torture. Part III focuses on the legal issues surrounding the debate;
namely, it defines terms pertinent to discussion, and sets forth criteria (in
other words, the elements) for determining whether prohibited torture is
properly characterized as ajus cogens norm under international law. The
criteria are then applied by enumerating and examining the major
international and regional instruments that codify the prohibition. Part
IV focuses more on the moral question at the heart of the debate. The
three main competing views held by the international community are
outlined and analyzed. Part V, the conclusion, summarizes the main
propositions set forth in this paper.
II. Torture Then & Now: History & Methods
2.1 A Torturous Past
A. The First "Torturable" Class
Edward Peters' book Torture traces the origin of the practice to
the Greek- Roman era, where wealth and power were centralized by
conquering other states and enslaving the inhabitants.' 4 Slaves, viewed
as the spoils of war (in other words, property to be controlled), quickly
became the first "torturable" class; as such, they were subjected to
14 EDWARD PETERS, TORTURE 11 (expanded ed., U. Pa. Press 1996) (1985).
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various forms of torture on a regular basis. The methods of torture
included, but were not limited to, being "whipped, beaten with rods or
chains, stretched on the rack, exposed to red hot metal, confined in
quarters that required painful constriction of their bodies or in a device
that pulled their legs apart . . . ."15 Soon thereafter the torturable class
grew to include criminals as well as anyone who might have witnessed
the commission of a crime. Once convicted, the defendant was then
subjected to post-conviction torture. Common post-conviction methods
of torture included, among others, "crucifixion, mutilation, and the
subjection of the allegedly guilty person to the appetites of wild animals
in an arena."
16
B. Church, State, and Torture
Throughout history, churches and other religious institutions
have condemned torture while simultaneously resorting to its methods to
punish labeled sinners and thus enforce God's mandates. For example,
despite the Catholic Church's condemnation of torture, in 1252, Pope
Innocent IV extended the torturable class to include those accused or
convicted of being heretics. 17 The government, with the blessings of the
church, delegated the responsibility of carrying out torture to the civil
authorities in a deliberate effort to shield the highest officials from any
allegations of impropriety.
In Western Europe, as in Rome, torture and religious fanaticism
were strange bedfellows. Prior to the emergence and development of the
modem Western legal system, "signs from God" determined innocence
or guilt.18 A person accused of heresy, blasphemy, or any other moral-
religious offense had to withstand a battery of tests. These tests included
"plunging hands into flames, hot water, or heated metal and forcing the
suspect to walk on hot plowshares."' 9 Survival of such tests was not
enough to exculpate a defendant, however. The standard for the accused
was two-fold: to survive and to sustain no serious injuries. The final
decision on the matter was left to a judicial magistrate, who would
15 JOHN CONROY, UNSPEAKABLE ACTS, ORDINARY PEOPLE: THE DYNAMICS OF
TORTURE 27 (2000).
16 Id. at 28.
17 id.
1id
19 Id
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examine the accused a few days after the ordeal.20 Not surprisingly,
most individuals failed these tests.
C. Judicial Torture (Torture Warrants)
The "sign of God" method for determining guilt or innocence
was eventually replaced by the "two witnesses or one confession" rule.
Under this rule, a conviction could only be obtained if it was
accompanied by the testimony of two witnesses or one confession.2'
"Suggestive questioning" 22 (that is, leading interrogations) and general
confessions were prohibited. According to legal historian John
Langbein, "If the accused confessed to the slaying, he was supposed to
be asked where he put the dagger. If he said he buried it under the oak
tree, the examining magistrate was suppose to send someone to dig it
up."'23 Unfortunately, the change in the burden of proof opened the door
for a new wave of torture. Civil authorities found it easier to obtain one
confession than to track down two individuals willing to testify against
the defendant. By the sixteenth century, magistrates freely issued torture
warrants and judicially sanctioned torture24 was firmly entrenched into
the western legal tradition.
[V]ictims were commonly subjected to the rack;
the strappado (a procedure, also known as the corda or
cola, in which the defendant hung from the wrists, which
were tied behind his or her back, and dropped halfway to
the ground, the drop ending with a sudden jerk); various
pressure devices that evolved into the leg screw and thumb
screw; extremely tight tying of the hands (chiefly used on
20 id.
21 See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF: EUROPE AND
ENGLAND IN THE ANCIENT REGIME 4 (1977). There was a third option under this
rule: the use of circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence was used to
establish what was known as "half proof." To get the other half a confession
was necessary. Hence, a magistrate would issue a torture warrant.
22 Id. at 5; CONROY, supra note 15, at 30.
23 LANGBEIN, supra note 21, at5.
24 CONROY, supra note 15, at 30. Judicial torture is defined as "[t]he use of
physical coercion by officers of the state in order to gather evidence for judicial
proceedings." Id. See also LANGBEIN, supra note 21, at 94-124, for a
comprehensive list of torture warrants issued from 1540-1640.
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women and children); burning the soles of feet; and sleep
deprivation (forty hours was the common period of time).
Torture warrants were issued as late as the eighteenth century.
26
D. Trial by Jury as an Alternative to Torture
Around the mid-eighteenth century, European jurists,
philosophers and scholars began to promote the idea of trial by jury as an
alternative to torture and capital punishment primarily because they were
no longer immune from the practice. 27 In their view, a trial by jury
served dual purposes. First, it reduced the burden of proof necessary to
convict a defendant. Police no longer had to find two witnesses or obtain
a confession by force. Instead, they could investigate a crime, collect
evidence, and submit it to an independent panel charged with the duty of
deciding innocence or guilt. Second, a trial by jury diffused culpability
by inculpating the community at-large. If the wrong person was
25 CONROY, supra note 15, at 29.
26 Id. at 31. See PETERS, supra note 14, at 74 ("The Constitutio criminalis
carolina of 1532 for the [German] Empire, the Ordonnance royale of 1537 for
France, the Nueva recopilacion of 1567 for Spain, the ordinance of Philip II of
1570 for the Spanish Netherlands, and the Grand ordannance criminelle of 1670
France together constituted the largest body of legislation concerning torture the
world had ever seen, enforced by the greatest powers in the world.").
27 For example, Italian philosopher Cesare Beccaria argued that torture is cruel
and inhuman, prevents the truth from being discovered, and is often arbitrarily
used against the innocent and poor:
[I]f this truth is hard to discover from the bearing, the gestures
and the expression of a man at rest, it will be much the harder
to discover it from a man in whom every feature, by which
men's faces sometimes betray the truth against their will, has
been altered by spasms of pain. Every violent action confuses
and clouds the tiny differences in things, which sometimes
serves to distinguish the truth from falsehood. . . A strange
consequence, which necessarily follows from the use of
torture, is that the innocent are put in a worse position than the
guilty. For, if both are tortured, the former has everything
against him. Either he confesses the crime and is convicted, or
he is acquitted and has suffered unwarranted punishment....
CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Kenelm Foster & J. Grigson
trans., 1964) (1764), reprinted in PETERS, supra note 14, at 264-269.
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convicted and subsequently tortured or executed by the state, everyone-
not just the civil authorities-shared the responsibility. Eventually, most
states abolished the practice of torture, but retained the trial by jury
system.
2.2 Torture in the Twentieth Century ("No Holds Barred")
Silent acquiescence and world wars led to a rapid resurgence of
torture in the twentieth century. As this paper illustrates, torture was
historically used as a tool to gain evidence, to obtain a confession, or to
deter specific unwanted behavior. Despots such as Stalin, Hitler,
Mussolini, and the Japanese Imperial Army practiced torture for purely
nefarious reasons, such as to test the effects of experimental drugs and
medicines on humans, to test the efficiency of biological and chemical
weapons of warfare on humans, and to test the physical and mental
threshold of human body and spirit.
The Congressional Record on the Introduction of the Japanese
Imperial Army Disclosure Act of 1999 describes several methods of
torture used against both Chinese civilians and other prisoners of war
(POWs) during WWII. 28 For example, the "freezing air project" was a
method of torture in which prisoners were ordered outdoors during the
coldest days of winter and subjected to the elements and artificial air
until various parts of their body froze. The prisoners were then taken
back indoors where army personnel and Japanese medical students
experimented with various methods of thawing-all of which failed.2 9
Women, men, and children were left with rotting, protruding bones. 30 In
other "medical" experiments, men were dissected alive, and prisoners
were exposed to a myriad of lethal diseases. 31 Aerosol sprays containing
lethal viruses, such as Anthrax, were sprayed over entire prison and
civilian camps.32 There is also evidence that the Japanese Imperial Army
used civilians and prisoners for target practice, forced them into slavery,
28 145 CONG. REC. S14541-47 (1999) (statements of Sen. Feinstein on the
Japanese Imperial Disclosure Act of 1999).
29 Id.
30 id.
31 Japanese War Crimes & Trials: Murder Under the Sun (History Channel
television broadcast, Apr. 29, 2003) (Documentary, aired first in 1998).
32 id.
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and used systematic rape as a form of torture against female children and
women.
33
Unfortunately, many of the methods of torture practiced during
WWII continue to be practiced in repressive regimes around the world
today.34 It is worth noting, however, that some of the most infamous
cases of torture took place not in states labeled as "repressive" regimes or
part of the "axis of evil," but in democratic states that boasted of their
civility and consistently denounced the practice as barbaric. Section 2.3
focuses on one such state: the United States.
2.3 Torture in the United States
Those who fled England for America did so because they lived
in constant fear that they would be persecuted, tortured, or killed for
holding religious beliefs that differed from those in power. However,
once in the New World, these individuals sought to consolidate their
power by persecuting any person who did not share their beliefs.
Women believed to be practicing witchcraft were often targeted and
tortured; some were burned alive in public. Other colonial methods of
torture included, but were not limited to, branding the letters of the
charged-offense into the flesh of the accused for crimes such as heresy
and thievery, "piercing the tongue with a heated bodkin, a tool used for
poking holes in fabric or leather,, 35 and standing in extremely
uncomfortable positions for hours or days.
Albeit harsh, the methods of torture practiced against accused
witches, criminals, and religious minorities were mild compared to the
torture inflicted upon Native Americans and Blacks. Both groups were
treated as sub-humans; torturing them was acceptable and common.
Slaves were beaten, sold, mutilated, lynched, castrated, subjected to
experimental drugs without their knowledge or consent, raped, and
murdered. Even after slavery was abolished in the United States, local
33 JAMES YIN AND SHI YOUNG, THE RAPE OF NANKING: AN UNDENIABLE
HISTORY IN PHOTOGRAPHS I (2d ed. 1997) ("Between December 1937 and
March 1938 at least 369,366 Chinese civilians and prisoners of war were
slaughtered by the invading troops. An estimated 80,000 women and girls were
raped; many of them were then mutilated or murdered.... Thousands of victims
were beheaded, burned, bayoneted, buried alive, or disemboweled.").
34 See generally Amnesty International (AI), Stop Torture News, at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/stoptorture/news.do (last visited Feb. 17, 2005), for
a comprehensive list of recent cases in the news stories involving torture.
35 CONROY, supra note 15, at 32.
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law enforcement and white separatists organizations, such as the Klu
Klux Klan (KKK), 36 continued to target and torture minorities with
impunity, especially those incarcerated. Indeed, many criminologists
and sociologists argue that modem jails and prisons are little more than
an extension of the racist/slave ideology, exacerbated by capitalistic
demands for cheap labor, which has plagued America since slaves were
emancipated by President Abraham Lincoln.
[W]ith the rise of the industrial capitalism, unpaid prison
labor became a source of superprofits, a trend
accelerated by the Civil War, and the "penitentiary"
became the site of industrial slavery conducted under the
whip and other savagery....
Prior to the Civil War, the main form of
imprisonment-African-American slavery-was, like
the penitentiary, not to be regarded as torture. Slavery,
indeed was never legitimized by any claim that the
slaves were being punished for crimes or anything else..
• . This changed when Article 13, the Amendment that
abolished the old form of slavery, actually wrote slavery
into the Constitution-for people legally defined as
criminals....
At this point, tortures routinely inflicted on
slaves, especially whipping, became a standard feature
of the main site of penal incarceration: the prison
plantation. The antebellum plantation was merging with
the "penitentiary" to create the modem American prison
system.37
36 Although the KKK met in secrecy, its members openly conspired with local
authorities to terrorize, torture and annihilate Blacks and other minorities, such
as Jews, Asians, and homosexuals.
37 H. Bruce Franklin, The American Prison and the Normalization of Torture, at
http://www.historiansagainstwar.org/resources/torture/brucefranklin.html (last
visited Feb. 17, 2005). See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 ("Neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction.").
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The National Commission on Law Observance and
Enforcement 38 was the first governmental body established to assess law
enforcement officers' conduct and denounce the use of torture against
inmates. In its 1931 report 39 to the President, the Wickersham
Committee concluded that "'[t]he third degree-that is, the use of
physical brutality, or other forms of cruelty, to obtain involuntary
confessions or admissions-is widespread.' 40 Of particular concern to
the Wickersham Commission were the numerous documented cases of
torture that took place at the Chicago Detective's Bureau headquarters.4'
Reports of abuse included
[beatings with] clubs, blackjacks, rubber hoses,
telephone books, and whips . . .; exposing
prisoners to tear gas in an effort to gain a
confession; hanging them downward out of a
window in multistory buildings; handcuffing
suspects behind their backs and then lifting them
off the ground by their handcuffs; and squeezing
the testicles of men in custody.42
38 Established by President Herbert Hoover on May 10, 1929, and popularly
known as the Wickersham Commission, after its chairperson George W.
Wickersham, the Commission released fourteen reports on lawlessness within
the penal system in June 1930. Samuel Walker, Records of the Wickersham
Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Part 1: Records of the
Committee on Lawlessness, at http://www.lexisnexis.com/academic/guides/
jurisprudence/wickersham.asp (last visited Feb. 17, 2005).
39 Id. ("The Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement had a major impact on
public policy. As the first fully documented report on police misconduct, it
galvanized public opinion and mobilized reform efforts. At the municipal level,
it strengthened the hand of a new generation of reform-minded police chiefs. At
the national level, it helped foster a new climate of opinion regarding the need
for legal controls over police misconduct. This was reflected in the first
important Supreme Court decisions imposing constitutional standards on local
criminal justice officials [sic] in 1932, the year after the commission delivered
its report.").40 Id. (quoting NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND
ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 4 (1931)).
41 CONROY, supra note 15, at 32.
42 id.
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Almost thirty years later, in 1960, the Wickersham Commission
released another disturbing report involving inmate abuse at Tucker State
Prison Farm in Tucker, Arkansas. The methods of torture used include
"depriving inmates of food, inserting needles under their fingernails,
crushing their knuckles and testicles with pliers, applying electric shock
to their genitals with the 'Tucker Telephone,"'A inciting intra-prison
violence, such as gang rapes and murders, and putting prisoners in the
"hole" (solitary confinement) 44 for indeterminate amounts of time.45
In response to the overwhelming number of cases alleging police
brutality, the U.S. Supreme Court declared the use of torture
unconstitutional and held that a confession obtained by physical or
psychological coercion, trickery, or deceit is inadmissible in the
prosecution's case-in-chief against the defendant. The court also created
Miranda rights,46 which require an arresting officer to inform a suspect
43 Id. See Philip S. Anderson, Legal Basics and Humane Treatment Must be
Guaranteed by Federal Officials by Federal Courts in Local Facilities Housing
Immigrants, at http://www.abanet.org/media/post (last visited Feb. 17, 2005)
("The 'Tucker telephone' [was] an old crank telephone adapted with electrodes
that were attached to prisoners' genitalia and then hooked up to a car battery.
When the telephone was cranked, inmates received a short, intense and
paralyzing shock.").
44 The "hole" is a very small, dark room that usually contains a toilet and wash
basin. Whether an inmate has a bed or is given clothing depends on prison
policies. Visitation, as well as other forms of communication, is either limited
or prohibited outright. The prisoner is normally allowed one hour or less to
leave the room, to shower, and maybe to walk around the prison yard. Many
prisoners have lost their sanity while in the "hole."
45 The author of this paper received communications from prison inmates
located at Tucker, Cummins, and Newport Correctional Facilities-all in
Arkansas. Newport is a women's facility. The names and/or prison identification
numbers have been withheld for safety concerns.
46 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), reprinted in
RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE FOURTH, FIFTH, AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS AND RELATED
AREAS 1177-1256 (3d ed. 1995). "In a series cases decided by this court long
after [the Wickersham Commission reports], the police resorted to physical
brutality-beating, hanging, whipping-and to sustained and protracted
questioning incommunicado in order to extort confessions .... ." Id. at 1179
(referring to Miranda). See also People v. Wakat, 415 Ill. 610, 114 N.E.2d 706
(1953); Wakat v. Harlib, 253 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1958) (defendant required eight
months of extensive physical therapy after being beaten in police custody);
Bruner v. People, 113 Colo. 194, 156 P.2d 111 (1945) (defendant held
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of his or her Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. Notwithstanding these protections, there
has been an alarming rise in the number of cases alleging police brutality
since September 11, 2001.7
The United States also has an extensive history of supporting
foreign regimes known to practice torture on non-U.S. citizens either for
financial/political reasons or in the name of national security. "From
1945 to the end of the century, the United States attempted to overthrow
more than 40 foreign governments, and to crush more than 30 populist-
nationalist movements struggling against intolerable regimes., 48 Some
examples are America's activities in the 1950s in Vietnam, Cambodia,
and Laos, which led to the torture and summary execution of millions of
civilians.49 America has also been criticized for its financial and military
support of dictators and repressive states, such as Chang Kai Shek of
Pre-Communist China (1945-1949),5o Marcos of the Philippines (1945-
incommunicado for two months and deprived of food for over fifteen hours,
forced to take lie detector test just to use the bathroom); People v. Matlock, 51
Cal. 2d 682, 336 P.2d 505 (1959) (defendant deprived of sleep and interrogated
until he confessed to a lie). See generally AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
ILLINOIS DIVISION, SECRET DETENTION BY THE CHICAGO POLICE (1959);
Charles S. Potts, The Preliminary Examination and the "Third Degree", 2
BAYLOR L. REV. 131 (1950); David L. Sterling, Police Interrogation and the
Psychology of Confession, 14 J. PUB. L. 25 (1965).
47 See Robert Cooper, Order, Force and Law in a New Era, CRIMES OF WAR
PROJECT: THE MAG., Sept. 2002, available at http://www.crimesofwar.org/sept-
mag/sept-cooper.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2005); see also Anthony Dworkin &
Ariel Meyerstein, International Law Since September II-A Timeline, CRIMES OF
WAR PROJECT: THE MAG., at http://www.crimesofwar.org/sept-mag/printer-
timeline.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2005).
48 DOUBLE STANDARDS, WHY DO THEY HATE US?, at
http://www.doublestandards.org/enemies.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2005) (citing
WILLIAM BLUM, ROGUE STATE: A GUIDE TO THE WORLD'S ONLY SUPERPOWER
(2002); see generally WILLIAM BLUM, KILLING HOPE: US INTERVENTION IN THE
THIRD WORLD (2d ed. 2001), available at http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com
/Blum/KillingHopepage.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2005) (containing excerpts
from KILLING HOPE).
49 Nicole Barrett, Note, Holding Individual Leaders Responsible for Violations
of Customary International Law: The U.S. Bombardment of Cambodia and
Laos, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 429 (2001).
50 See, e.g., COMMUNIST PARTY OF AUSTL., A HISTORY OF U.S. WARS OF
AGGRESSION AND INTERVENTION, at http://www.cpa.org.au (last visited Feb. 17,
2005) (noting that the United States intervened in Chinese civil war against the
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1953) 5 1 Pinochet of Argentina (1973-1987),52 the Shah of Iran (1953-
1979), 53 General Somoza Debayle of Nicaragua (1978-1989), 54 Suharto
Mao's who were struggling for liberation, supported known human rights
violator Chiang Kai-shek, and used defeated Japanese soldiers to fight the
Chinese people); DOUBLE STANDARDS, supra note 48. See generally THE
COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (6th ed. 2001), at http://www.bartleby.com/65/ch/
ChiangKa.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2005).
51 COMMUNIST PARTY OF AUSTL., supra note 50. While left-wing Huks were
fighting the Japanese invaders, the U.S. initiated a war with them. The Huks lost
and the United States established puppet government led by Dictator Ferdinand
Marcos, who subsequently tortured and murdered many of his citizens and
"enemies" designated as such by the U.S. government. Id.
52 In 1970, Salvador Allende was elected President by the Popular Unity
Coalition of Socialists and Communists. In August 1973, President Allende
appointed Augusto Pinochet as commander-in-chief of the army. On September
11, 1973, President Allende was killed when the presidential palace was bombed
in a violent coup. Between September 11, 1973 and December 1973, over 1,200
people were tortured, murdered, or disappeared. See Special Report: Augusto
Pinochet, Chile under Pinochet-A Chronology, GUARDIAN, Jan. 15, 1999, at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/pinochet/Story/0,,209222,00.html (last visited Feb.
17, 205). The former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and several other
former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officers are currently under
investigation for aiding Pinochet in the coup and supplying the Chilean military
with the names of leftwing Americans and other dissidents in Chile, who were
later rounded up (in what became known as "Operation Candor") intimidated,
tortured, and murdered. Jonathan Franklin & Duncan Campbell, Kissinger May
Face Extradition to Chile, GUARDIAN, June 12, 2002, at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4431760-103681,00.html (last visited
Feb. 17, 2005); Tito Tricot, Remembering September 11 1973, GUARDIAN, Sept.
16, 2002, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4502058-103681,00.html
(last visited Feb. 17, 2005); James Brookfield, FBI Helped Pursue Pinochet's
Political Opponents in the US, WORLD SOCIALIST WEB SITE, Feb. 11, 1999, at
http://www.wsws.org/articles/1999/feb 999/pino-fl I .shtml (last visited Feb. 17,
2005).
53 In 1953, the United States and Britain provided Iranian military officers with
intelligence services to aid the overthrowing of Prime Minister Muhammed
Mussadeq, a man the U.S. despised because he was a proponent of nationalizing
the oil industry--a decision that would have adversely affected all western
economies that relied on oil. Additionally, the United States backed the brutal
Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlavi of Iran, who was overthrown by Ayatollah
Khomeini. Ironically, Khomeini's human rights' record was no better than his
predecessors. See Iran Chronology, at http://www.khomeini.com/gatewatto
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of Indonesia (1965), 55 Osama bin Ladin of Afghanistan (1979-1992),56
Saddam Hussein of Iraq (1990s, 2003);" Haiti (1915-1991),58 Brazil
(1961-64), 59 Israel (1947),60 and South Africa (1950s- 1990s).6I
heaven/Articles/USAIranChronology.htm (last visited Jan. 1 2004 and on file
with Review and Author).
14 STEPHEN DYcUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 448-54 (2d ed. 1997).
After the Sandinistas replaced General Somoza, they began to "aid the leftist
insurgency in El Salvador and turned toward Cuba and the Soviet Union for
political, military, and financial assistance." Id. In response, the United States
secretly and illegally aided Nicaraguan Contras. Despite the fact Congress
explicitly prohibited such aid, President Reagan felt "strongly about the Contras,
and he ordered his staff, in the words of the National Security Advisor, to find a
way to keep the Contras 'body and soul together."' Id. When President Reagan
could not get funding from Congress, he placed Lt. Col. Oliver L. North in
charge of running a full-scale operation to raise money and arms for the Contras.
Between 1984 and 1986, the U.S. government secretly raised over $34 million
for the Contras from other countries and another $2.7 million from private
organizations. The funds raised were filtered through the "Enterprise," a
"dummy" corporation created to engage in covert activities on behalf of the
United States. Meanwhile, extremists in Iran took some U.S. citizens hostage in
Tehran. In 1985, the Israeli government proposed that the U.S. sell missiles to
Iran in exchange for the hostages. Both the Secretary of State and Secretary of
Defense opposed the proposal, but President Reagan authorized Israel to sell the
missiles anyways. Profits made from the sell were then transferred to the
Contras in Nicaragua. The Contras used the funding to capture, torture and kill
the Sandinistas. On November 3, 1986, Beirut's weekly Al-Shiraa reported that
the U.S. had secretly sold weapons to the Iranians in exchange for hostages,
triggering the Iran-Contra scandal. Id. It is interesting to note that at the time
the U.S. was selling arms to Iran, it was also selling arms to Iraq to help it defeat
Iran. At the time, Iran was listed as a "designated state sponor" of terrorism by
the U.S. State Department. See U.S. Dep't of State, Office of the Coordinator
for Counterterrorism, State Sponsors of Terrorism, available at http:/www.
state.gov/s/ct/c 1415 1.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
55 The United States backed a coup by General Suharto to oust democratically
elected President Sukarno. The U.S. Embassy supplied Suharto names of people
who were to be "dealt with." Over one million people were hunted down,
tortured and killed. Decades of repression followed. See COMMUNIST PARTY OF
AUSTL., supra note 50.
56 Id. The feudal monarchy was overthrown in the 1970s and replaced by a
progressive government which carried out land reforms, introduced universal
education (for both men and women), gave women equal rights, and established
a friendship with its neighbor, the Soviet Union. In response, the United States
gave billions of dollars in aid to the opposition waging a war against the
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progressive leaders. More than one million were killed, three million disabled,
and another five million became refugees-in other words, half of the total
population. With U.S. aid and training, clerical-fascists known as the Taliban
took over the country, repealing all progressive laws. Ironically, U.S.-trained
Taliban leader Osama bin Laden has been accused of orchestrating the
September 11 th terrorist attacks against the United States.
57 Id. During the Gulf War, the U.S. "carried out the most concentrated aerial
bombardment in world history, dropping 177 million pounds of bombs on the
Iraqi people. Napalm and cancer-causing depleted uranium weapons were used
.... America's aim: to establish U.S. military bases and gain control over Iraq's
vast oil reserves." Id. The U.S. is currently at war with Iraq.
58 DYCUS ET AL, supra note 54, at 391-92. After a Haitian president was killed,
the United States sent some Marines to Port-au-Prince. U.S forces remained in
Haiti until 1933, at which time the Marines turned the state over to the military:
"From 1931 to 1991, Haiti was ruled by a succession of military juntas and
authoritarian rulers, including the Duvaliers." Id. The United States supported
the Duvaliers, CIA-backed torturers, drug traffickers and death squads.
COMMUNIST PARTY OF AUSTL., supra note 51. Duvalier was eventually driven
out of the country. In 1990, Jean Aristide was elected President. Less than a
year later, Aristide was overthrown by military juntas "that continued the
brutalities of the Duvalier regimes, using paramilitary militias and Haiti's army
of 7,000 to terrorize opponents." Id.
59 Id. "Progressive President Goulart limited profits of multi-national
companies, nationalized a U.S. communications corporation, and adopted an
independent foreign policy opposing sanctions on Cuba." Id. In response, the
U.S. backed opponents of Goulart in a 1964 coup, "initiating death squads,
disappearances, torture and violent military suppression of civilian
demonstrations." Id.
60 Garry Leech, Alienating the International Community, COLOM. J. ONLINE
(Sept. 24, 2001), at http://colombiajournal.org/colombia82.htm (last visited Feb.
17, 2005). In 1947, Western powers took land from the Palestinians and gave it
to the Jews, creating the current state of Israel. With the financial and military
support of the United States, Israel declared a war in 1967, whereby it seized
more land, causing more friction between Israel and the rest of the Arab world.
Since Israel's inception, "Washington has repeatedly stood alone with Israel in
voting against UN resolutions condemning Israel's military rule of the occupied
territories and treatment of Palestinians as second class-citizens in their own
land .... [M]uch of the weaponry used to target, torture, and kill Palestinians is
supplied by Washington (Israel is the largest recipients of U.S. military aid) ...
" Id. It is worth noting that Israel is also the only "democratic" government
that has openly permitted its investigators to torture detainees suspected of
committing or conspiring to commit acts against the state.
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2.4 Concluding Remarks
A historical review of torture is telling, in so far as it
demonstrates the inherent illegitimacy of the practice. First employed by
the Greeks and Romans as an exhibition of absolute power against entire
populations of conquered people, the practice of torture quickly became
the preferred tool of the oppressor-the oppressor being, the conqueror,
the colonizer, the dictator, and the segregator. Powerful states,
institutions, and individuals, guided primarily by irrational fears, selfish
interests, or by a feeling of self-righteousness and superiority, have
employed torturous techniques to terrorize the powerless into
submission. The history of torture also tells another story, one of
expansion. There is no such thing as a little torture. There is no
distinguishable class. No one is immune. Perhaps the worst legacy of
torture is its long line of mangled, mutilated victims, each with his or her
own horrific story. Those stories, often told in tears, eventually led to
international condemnation; and, subsequently, to international and
regional codifications prohibiting the practice.
III. The Legal Debate: Is Torture a Violation of Jus Cogens
Norms Under Customary International Law?
3.1 Definitions
A. Torture
The U.N. Convention Against Torture (C.A.T)62 provides the
most contemporaneous and widely accepted definition of torture.
According to Article 1, torture is:
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a
person for such purposes as obtaining from her or a third
6 1 The United States continued to support the South African apartheid
government, despite United Nations' boycotts and countless reports from
credible sources that the government was engaged in the practice of
systematically detaining, torturing, and murdering black South Africans.
62 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, opened for signature on Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 23
I.L.M. 1027 (entered into force June 26, 1987), reprinted in BASIC HUMAN
RIGHTS DOCUMENTS 229 (Ian Brownlie & Guy S. Goodwin-Gill eds., 4th ed.
2002).
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party information or a confession, punishing him for an act
he or a third person has committed, or suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a
public official or other person acting in an official
capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only• 63
from, inherent in, or incidental to lawful sanctions.
B. Customary International Law
Customary international law refers to the "general practices of
states which, over a period of time, becomes binding law through
repetition and adoption. 64  According to the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, a customary international norm is:
(a) a concordant practice by a number of states
with reference to a type of situation falling within the
domain of international relations; (b) a continuation or
repetition of the practice over a considerable period of
time; (c) a conception that the practice is required or
consistent with prevailing international law; and (d)
general acquiescence in the practice by other states.6 5
There is no set number of states that must accept a practice before it is
considered a customary norm; as such, complete conformity is not a
prerequisite for recognizing customary international norms. If a state
strongly objects to an emerging customary norm, "it may, by becoming a
persistent objector, prevent the rule from becoming binding upon it,
although other states will still be bound. 6 6
C. Jus Cogens Norms
Generally speaking, jus cogens norms "are the highest rules of
international law, and function essentially as 'very strong rule[s] of
63 Id.
64 Karen Parker & Lyn Beth Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of
Human Rights, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 411 (1989).
65 Id. at 417 (citing [Roach Death Penalty] Case 9647, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 147,
166 OEA/ser. LN/1I.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987)).
66 Parker & Neylon, supra note 64, at 417-18.
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customary international law.' 6 7 More specific definitions of the word
vary. Some scholars define the word substantively, others stress its
procedural effects.68 Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, 69 which refers tojus cogens as "peremptory ' 70 norms, combines
the two by simply stating that "a treaty is void if, at the time of its
conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international
law."
7 1
Jus cogens norms have also been defined by their "character of
upholding world order"72 Indeed, it is this definition ofjus cogens that
the Mexican delegate to the United Nations, Javier Suarez, adopted
during the Vienna Conference of 1971 :73 "The rules ofjus cogens [are]
those rules which derive from principles that the legal conscience of
mankind deem[s] absolutely essential to the coexistence [of] the
international community. 7 4
Other definitions of the word emphasize its restrictive nature.
Unlike international customary norms, jus cogens norms are binding
upon all states and permit absolutely no derogation, regardless of how
many states may object to the norm.
If the will of a state conflicts with ajus cogens
norm, the operation ofjus cogens requires the state to
acquiesce to thejus cogens norm. The binding nature of
jus cogens limits the substance of valid treaties of
international agreement and makes agreements that
conflict with its norms void. The binding, peremptory
67 Id. at 417 (citing A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 132 n.73 (1971)).68 Id. at 414.
69 The Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties, opened for signature May
23, 1969,1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1970)
[hereinafter the Vienna Convention].
70 Id. art. 53.
71 Id.; see also LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT, CRITERIA, PRESENT STATUS
2 (Lakimiesliton Kustannus ed., 1998); BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R.
TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (3d ed. 1999).
72 Parker & Neylon, supra note 64, at 415.
73 U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, 1st and 2d Sess., Vienna, Mar. 26-
May 24, 1968, U.N. Doc. A/CONF./39/11 /Add/2 (1971).
74 Parker & Neylon, supra note 64, at 415 (quoting Mexican delegate Mr. Javier
Suarez Medina).
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nature of jus cogens does not allow for derogation. For
this reason, jus cogens norms must invalidate any
instrument, judicial order, executive order or legislative
act that contravenes them."
A final definition ofjus cogens norms is derived from the texts
that define the norm by describing the acts that constitute a violation of
it. For example, after clarifying that not all customary international laws
have the status of jus cogens norms, the Restatement on Foreign
Relations76 defines jus cogens offenses as those acts enumerated in
clauses (a) to (f), namely, "genocide, slavery and slave trading, murder
or causing the disappearance of individuals, torture or other cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged arbitrary
detention, systematic racial discrimination, or a consistent pattern of
gross violations of internationally recognized human rights." 77
3.2 Transforming Customary Norms to Jus Cogens Norms
Article 53 of the Vienna Convention sets forth the three criteria
that must be present before a customary international norm is elevated to
the status of ajus cogens norm:
For the purposes of the present Convention, a
peremptory norm of general international law is [1] a
norm accepted and recognized by the international
community of states as a whole as [2] a norm from
which no derogation is permitted and [3] which can be
modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character.78
75 Id. at 416 (internal citations omitted).
76 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 702 (1987).
77 See also Parker & Neylon, supra note 64, at 430, which cites 75 DEP'T. OF
STATE BULL No. 1932 (1976) 1, at 3 (quoting former Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger as making the following statement at an Organization of American
States (OAS) meeting: "[T]here are standards below which no government can
fall without offending fundamental values such as genocide, officially tolerated
torture, mass imprisonment or murder, or the comprehensive denial of basic
rights to racial, religious, political, or ethnic groups. Any government engaging
in such practices must face adverse international judgment.").
78 Vienna Convention, supra note 69, art. 53.
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A. Recognition & Acceptance by the International
Community as a Whole
Norms of "general international law" are norms that are
generally applicable to all states. When members of the International
Law Commission (ILC) 79 met in 1976 to discuss the meaning of "as a
whole,, 80 they agreed that the words "as a whole" were not synonymous
with "unanimous recognition by all members [of the international
community].",81  Hence, the prevailing view is that the words
"'acceptance by the international community of States as a whole' means
the acceptance by all essential components [in other words, a majority]
of the international community of States. 82
B. Non-Derogability
The most distinct feature ofjus cogens norms is that they permit
no derogations. Since jus cogens norms are non-derogable, a suspect
accused of violating a norm will find little, if any, refuge in this world.
Under the doctrine of universal jurisdiction, any state can assume
jurisdiction and try an individual for his or her transgression of jus
cogens norms.
83
79 HANNIKAINEN, supra note 71 at 211 (citing the International Law Commission
Report 1976, U.N. Doc. A/31/10 287).80 id
81 Id
82 id
83 See Bartram S. Brown, The Evolving Concept of Universal Jurisdiction, 35
NEW ENG. L. REVIEw 384 (2001). The principle of universal jurisdiction
provides every state with jurisdiction over a limited category
of offenses generally recognized as of universal concern,
regardless of the situs of the offense and the nationalities of
the offender and the offended. While the other jurisdictional
bases demand direct connections between the prosecuting state
and the offense, the universality principle assumes that every
state has an interest in exercising jurisdiction to combat
egregious offenses that states universally have condemned.
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C. Modification by a New Peremptory Norm of General
International Law
According to one scholar, "The prohibition of modification
particularly concerns treaty provisions, special customs, titles, regimes
and other instruments which are in conflict with peremptory norms, and
themselves constitute legal and valid sources for other acts. 84  The
modification requirement also prevents one or a few states from
modifying the status ofjus cogens norms by simply denouncing those
norms that fail to suit their particular interests. For example, in the
Nicaragua Case,5 the International Court of Justice held that the United
States was in violation of several jus cogens norms, despite the U.S.
government's contention that such violations were merely acts of
"collective self defense. 86 In explaining its decision, the Court stated:
"If a State acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a recognized rule,
but defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications
contained within the rule itself ... the significance of that attitude is to
confirm rather than weaken the rule. 8 7
84 HANNIKAINEN, supra note 71 (stating that jus cogens norms function to
protect "society and its institutions from [the] harmful consequences of
individual agreements").
85 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicr. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 98 (June 27).
In this case, Nicaragua filed an application to institute proceedings against the
United States for its involvement in military and paramilitary operations within
the country. The ICJ first issued a provisional order, restricting U.S. access to
Nicaraguan ports, in particular, and the laying of mines. After preliminary set
backs, such as jurisdictional issues and America's refusal to attend the
proceedings, the Court held that the U.S. violated the following customary and
jus cogens norms: intervening in the internal affairs of another state, violation of
the prohibition against force (aggression) against one state, violation of
prohibition on infringing the sovereignty of another state, and violation of
prohibition against interrupting peaceful and maritime commerce. Additionally,
the Court found that the U.S. had violated other obligations arising out of the
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation of 1956. Id
86 Id.
87 id.
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D. A Word on States' Obligations to Respect and Adhere to
Jus Cogens Norms
Although the international community has yet to reach a
consensus on an enforcement 88 scheme for serious human rights
violations, it has agreed that the principles of erga omnes must be
respected. 89 Because jus cogens norms are superior to all others, the
88 Kerstin Bartsch & Bjdrn Elberling, Jus Cogens vs. State Immunity, Round
Two: The Decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the
Kalogeropoulou et al. v. Greece and Germany Decision, 4 GERMAN LAW
JOURNAL 5, 476, 486 (2003) (noting that "every jus cogens rule contains or
P resupposes a procedural rule which guarantees its judicial enforcement").
Id. (arguing that erga omnes "creates obligations by each state, so that a
violation by a state of the rights of persons subject to its jurisdiction is a breach
of obligation to all other states."). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702, cmt. o (1987). See, e.g.,
Mutomba v. Switzerland, Communication No. 13/1993, U.N. Committee
Against Torture, Decision of Apr. 27, 1994, reprinted in 15 HuM. RTS. L. J. 164
(1994). In this case, the U.N. Committee Against Torture forbade Switzerland
from deporting Mutomba back to Zaire where he claimed he would be tortured
and killed. Despite the fact that Mutomba fled to Switzerland to evade
prosecution for committing crimes against humanity and crimes against Geneva
Convention Common Article 3, the Committee held that Switzerland had a duty
to protect those within its territory. In fact, the Committee went a step farther
and issued an interim protection for Mutomba. The Committee's determination,
coupled with the drastic measures it took to protect Mutomba from deportation,
leave no room for doubt that (1) the prohibition against torture is absolute and
(2) states' affirmative duties to protect individuals from torture is paramount.
See also Veldsquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4 (1998). In this case, the Inter-American Court held that
among other grave violations of the American Convention, the Honduran
government violated Article 5(2), which prohibits the practice of torture, as well
as Article 1(1), which bestows an affirmative obligation upon states to protect
their citizens from such violations. This "protection" includes an obligation to
seriously investigate reports of grave human rights abuses. See also Megan
Hagler & Francisco Rivera, Bamaca Veldsquez v. Guatemala: An Expansion of
the Inter-American System's Jurisprudence on Reparations, HUM. RTS. BRIEF,
Spring 2002, at 2. Hagler and Rivera address a case that involved the
Guatemalan army and its capture of Efrain Bamaca Veldsquez, a Mayan
comandante, who was secretly detained and tortured for over a year before he
was killed in September 1993. The Inter-American Court found that the
Guatemalan government had violated American Convention on Human Rights
Art. 1(1) (Obligation to Respect Rights), among other violations. See generally
Baena Ricardo et al. Case, Judgment of Feb. 2, 2001, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
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principle of erga omnes is always triggered by jus cogens violations.
This, in turn, gives conforming states the right to force non-conforming
states to adhere to the violated norms, including the right of reprisals. 90
3.3 The Prohibition of Torture as a Jus Cogens Norm
In order to determine if a norm is customary, one must examine
the "custom and usages of civilized nations; and as evidence of these, the
works of jurists and commentators." 91 To determine if a customary norm
is considered ajus cogens norm, one must apply the customary norm test
and then apply the criteria set forth above. The easiest way to accomplish
either task is to locate and examine all pertinent international and
regional instruments that codify the prohibition or tribunals that discuss
its significance under international law. The remainder of Part III
performs such examination.
A. International Codifications
1. The Geneva Conventions
In response to the atrocities committed during the Crimean and
Civil wars, twelve European nations met in Geneva, Switzerland, to draft
rules for treating the sick and wounded during war time in 1864. The
product, the Geneva Convention Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded in Armies in the Field,92 was the "first of many treaties
establishing laws whose violation would be taken to constitute war
crimes."
93
C) No. 72 (2001); Caballero Delgado and Santana Case, Judgment of Dec. 8,
1995, Inter-Am. Ct. (Ser. C) No. 22 (1995); Judicial Guarantees in States of
Emergency (Arts. 27(2), 25, and 8 of the American Convention on Human
Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-9/87, October 6, 1987, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
A)No. 7 (1987).
89 Bartsch & Elberling, supra note 88, at 476.
89 Parker & Neylon, supra note 64, at 417.
90 Bartsch & Elberling, supra note 88, at 476.91 Parker and Neylon, supra note 64, at 417.
92 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, adopted on Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva I, Armed Forces in
the Field].
93 David Greenberg, Fighting Fair, The Laws of War and How They Grew, Jan.
17, 2002, SLATE, at http://slate.msn.com/id/2060816/ (last visited Feb. 19,
2005). Greenberg notes that after the first Geneva Convention, between 1899
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The 1864 accord stated that ambulances and hospitals were
to be regarded as neutral; that hospital workers and
patients were to be unmolested; that the wounded or sick
soldiers would receive medical care, regardless of their
loyalties; and that the Red Cross could freely travel
through combat zones to aid the wounded.94
Between 1929 and 1949, three other Geneva Conventions 95 were
drafted and universally adopted by the international community as a
whole. Combined, these conventions extend protections to
noncombatants, POWS, and the wounded.96 In particular, Article 3 of
Geneva III prohibits "(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder
of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b) taking of
hostages; [and] (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment. 97
and 1907, there were a series of conferences held at The Hague, which led to an
extensive catalogue of wartime rules:
These treaties still make up the essence of today's
international. They required that prisoners received decent
food, shelter, and clothing; that guerillas and other citizen-
soldiers obey the same laws as official military personnel; that
combatants respect institutions devoted to religion, charity,
education, art, and science; that surrendering enemies not be
killed or injured; that defenseless towns or buildings not be
attacked; and that soldiers not pillage or confiscate property.
Id.
94 Id.
95 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick
and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces, adopted on Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva II, Armed
Forces at Sea]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, adopted on Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S.
135 [hereinafter Geneva III, Prisoners of War]; and Geneva Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Person in Time of War, adopted on Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter (Geneva IV,
Protection of Civilians].
96 Greenberg, supra 93.
97 Geneva III, supra note 95, art. 3.
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2. The United Nations
The United Nations Charter of 1945 was the first post-war
international instrument advocating human rights and admonishing
inhumane treatment of civilians and prisoners. Although the Charter is
non-binding, member states agree to have a "universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. 98 Additionally, Article
5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 99 which
entered into force in 1948, expressly prohibits the practice of torture:
"No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment."' 00
In 1966, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).'0 ' Article 7 of the
ICCPR prohibits "torture, cruel and inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment." One form of torture commonly used by the Nazis and the
Japanese Imperial Army is singled out and expressly prohibited: "In
particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical
or scientific experimentation." 10 2  Article 4(2) prohibits states from
derogating from Article 7.
Subsequently, the U.N. adopted Resolution 3452, the
Declaration of the Protection of All Persons from being Subjected to
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.'0 3  The Annex to the U.N. Declaration Against Torture
contains twelve articles that prohibit torture. 114 For example, Article 1 of
the Annex not only defines torture but also states that the practice of
torture "constitutes an aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment or punishment."' 0 5 Other articles impose an
98 U.N. CHARTER art. 55, para. c.
99 G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948)
[hereinafter Universal Declaration or UDHR].
100 Id.
101 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force Mar. 23,
1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
102 Id.
103 Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res.
3452, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, U.N. Doc. A/1034 (1975)
[hereinafter U.N. Declaration Against Torture].
104 Id. at Annex.
l05 Id. art. 1.
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affirmative duty on states to refrain from ordering persons tortured,'0 6 to
train their law enforcement agents on how to conduct an interrogation
without resorting to torture,10 7 to criminalize the practice of torture in
domestic law and investigate reported cases of torture, 10 to deem any
evidence obtained by torture inadmissible, 0 9 to punish perpetrators of
torture," 0 and to provide torture victims with some type of financial and
medical assistance. I
B. Regional Codifications
1. Europe & the European Union
The practice of torture has also been denounced on the other side
of the Atlantic. In 1955, the Council of Europe adopted the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms."12 Like the UDHR, Article 3 of the European Convention
expressly prohibits the practice of torture. Consistent with other treaties
and conventions, the prohibition is absolute." 3 In 2000, the European
Union adopted the Charter of Fundamental Rights." 4 Article 4 of the
Charter prohibits torture. The European Union adopted further measures
aimed at eradicating the practice and punishing its administrators in
2001."'
106 Id. arts. 4 and 6.
107 Id. art. 5.
108 Id. art. 9.
'09Id. art. 12.
"OM art. 10.
"' Id.
112 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221
(entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter European Convention], reprinted
in BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTS, supra note 62, at 398. This convention,
and a list of the states party to it, may also be viewed at
http://www.echr.coe.int/Convention/webConvenENG.pdf (last visited Feb. 19,
2005).
113 European Convention, supra note 112, art. 3.
114 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1
(entered into force Dec. 7, 2000).
115 European Union Adopts Guidelines to Combat Torture, PUCL BULLETIN,
(People's Union for Civil Liberties), June 2001, at http://www.pucl.org/
reports/International/2001/eu-torture.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2005).
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2. The Americas
The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,
which was adopted at the Ninth Inter-American Conference in 1948,116
provides that "[e]very human being has the right to life, liberty and
security of his person."'"17 Article 25 provides for the humane treatment
of detainees, and Article 26 prohibits the use of "cruel, infamous or
unusual punishment."
' 18
In 1959, the Inter-American Council of Jurists drafted a
Convention on Human Rights," 9  created the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, and established an Inter-American Court
for the Protection of Human Rights.' 20 Article 1(1) of the American
Convention imposes an affirmative duty on member states to respect and
protect the rights all persons within their jurisdiction. Article 5(2)
prohibits cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Article
27(2) prohibits the practice of torture. The distinction between Article
5(2) and Article 27(2), while seemingly subtle, is significant. Pursuant to
Chapter IV, Article 27, member states may, under limited circumstances,
suspend the guarantees specified in 5(2). Member states cannot,
however, derogate from Article 27(2) under any circumstances.
In February 1987, the Inter-American system adopted Inter-
American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture.'12  This
Convention focuses solely on the issue of torture and is arguably more
comprehensive than the U.N.'s C.A.T because it expressly imposes an
116 O.A.S. Res. XXX, O.A..S. Off. Rec. OEA/ser. L./V/I.4 rev., reprinted in
BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN
SYSTEM, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc. 6 rev. 1, at 17 (1992) [hereinafter the American
Declaration].
117 American Declaration, supra note 116, art. 1.
118 Id. art. 25.
119 American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22,
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 114, U.N.T.S. 123, 9 I.L.M. 673 (entered into force
July 18, 1978) [hereinafter American Convention or Pact of San Josd],
reprinted in BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTS, supra note 62, at 671.
12 A.H. ROBERTSON & J.G. MERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 199 (4th ed. 1996).
121 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, opened for
signature Dec. 9, 1985, O.A.S.T.S. No. 67, I.L.M. 519 (entered into force Feb.
28, 1987) [hereinafter Inter-American Convention on Torture or IACT],
reprinted in BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTS, supra note 62, at 703.
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affirmative obligation on signatories to protect individuals from torture
and to punish those who violate the Convention.'
22
3. Africa
Members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) formed
the African Commission on Human Rights and adopted the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights in 1981.23 Article 1 of the
African Charter provides that parties to the agreement "shall recognize
the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in [the] Charter and shall
undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to
them."'124 Article 5 expressly forbids "[a]ll forms of exploitation and
degradation of man particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel,
inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment .... 25 Since the
language found in the African Charter mimics the language in other
international and regional conventions, one can reasonably assume the
prohibition is absolute.
4. Arabia
In 1979, the Union of Arab Lawyers proposed an Arab
Convention on Human Rights, which guaranteed basic human rights
based on the Shari'ah126 and other Islamic laws. The Organization of the
Islamic Conference adopted the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in
Islam in August 1990. 2 With respect to the practice of torture, Article
2(d) guarantees freedom from bodily harm and imposes an affirmative
duty upon states to safeguard this freedom. Article 20 of the Cairo
Declaration strictly prohibits the use of torture for any reason:
122 IACT, supra note 121, art. 1.
123 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981,
OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217, 21 I.L.M. 58 (entered
into force Oct. 21, 1986) [hereinafter African Charter], reprinted in BASIC
HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTS, supra note 62, at 728.
124 African Charter, supra note 123, art. 1
125 Id. art. 5.
126 See THE AMERICAN DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA 727 (1998). Shar'iah (Sharia) is
the "[traditional law of Islam, believed by Muslims to be the result of divine
revelation. It is drawn from a number of sources, including the Koran and a
collection of teachings and legends about the life of Muhammad known as
Hadith."
127 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, adopted on Aug. 5, 1990,
reprinted in U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add.18 (1993); BASIC HUMAN
RIGHTS DOCUMENTS, supra note 62, at 764 [hereinafter Cairo Declaration].
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It is not permitted to subject him to physical or
psychological torture or to any form of humiliation,
cruelty or indignity. Nor is it permitted to subject an
individual to medical or scientific experimentation
without his consent or at the risk of his health or life.
Nor is it permitted to promulgate emergency laws that
would provide executive authority for such actions. 128
The Arab Charter on Human Rights was adopted in 1994.129
Article 13 not only prohibits the practice of torture but also imposes an
affirmative obligation on state parties to prevent torture and punish
offenders. Article 13(b) specifically forbids medical and scientific
torture. Pursuant to Article 4(c), member states may not derogate from
Article 13 under any circumstances.
C. Ad Hoc Tribunals & the International Criminal Court
1. The Yugoslavian & Rwandan War Crimes Tribunals
On May 25, 1993, the U.N. Security Council established the
Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal (ICTY), 130 in an attempt to bring peace
to the region and prosecute individuals charged with committing crimes
against humanity and violating the law of customs after 1991.13 Article
5(f) states that torture is a crime against humanity, that the ICTY is
institutionally competent, and has jurisdiction to prosecute individuals
128 Cairo Declaration, supra note 127, pmbl.
129 Arab Charter on Human Rights, opened for signature on Sept. 15, 1994, Res.
5437, 102d Sess., (not in force) reprinted in BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS
DOCUMENTS, supra note 62, at 724.
130 See United Nations Security Council Resolution on Establishing an
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International and Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 84th Sess., 3217th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159 (1993) [hereinafter
ICTY statute].
131 One of the first individuals indicted under the newly established tribunal was
former Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milosevic. Indicted on May 24, 1999,
"Milosevic was charged with several crimes against humanity, including killing
unarmed civilians and deportation of 800,000 Kosovo Albanians." Sophia
Piliouras, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and
Milosevic's Trial, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 515, 516 (2002).
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for the crime. Article 7 states that any person who "planned, instigated,
ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning,
preparation or execution of a crime referred to in Articles 2-5 of the
Statute,"132 is guilty of torture. Article 7(2)-(5) provides that all persons
acting under the color of law (in other words, in their official capacity)
may be held criminally liable for their actions.' 33 The Statute for the
International Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), established to try individuals
accused of committing gross human rights violations during the Hutus'
100-day genocide of Tutsis and moderate Hutus,134 contains the same list
of prohibitions found in the ICTY statute. 35
2. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
36
entered into force on July 2, 2002. Article 33 prohibits an individual
charged with grave human rights violations from escaping justice by
claiming that he or she was merely following orders. 37 Article 5 states,
"The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes
of concern to the international community as a whole." Among the
132 ICTY statute, supra note 130, art. 7.
1 Between April and June 1994, approximately 800,000 Tutsis were
slaughtered by Hutus immediately after Rwandan President Habyarimana plane
exploded. "In Kigali, the presidential guard immediately initiated a campaign of
retribution .... Within hours, recruits were dispatched all over the country to
carry out a wave of slaughter .... Encouraged by the presidential guard and
radio propaganda, an unofficial militia group called Interahamwe (meaning
those who attack together) was mobilized. At its peak, this group was 30,000-
strong." The genocide ended in July when the RPF captured Kigali and declared
a ceasefire. See Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened, BBC NEWS, Mar. 4,
2004, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/africa/1288230.stm (last visited Feb.
19, 2005).
135 See United National Security Council Resolution Establishing the
International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess.,
3453d mtg., at 15 U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 at Annex (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter
ICTR Statute].
136 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9,
opened for signature on July 17, 1998 (entered into force July 1, 2002),
reprintedin 37 I.L.M. 1002.
,3 Specifically, Article 33 states: "The fact that an accused person acted
pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior shall not relieve him of
criminal responsibility . .. ."
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"most serious" crimes is the practice of torture, which is prohibited in
Articles 6(b) (addressing genocide), 7(f) (addressing crimes against
humanity), Article 8(1), (2)(ii)(iii) (addressing war crimes/Geneva
Convention violations), and Article 55(b) (addressing the rights of the
persons during investigation). Article 8, which addresses individual
responsibility, is similar to Article 7 of the ICTY statute and Article 6 of
the ICTR statute.
3.4 Concluding Remarks
There are no regional or international instruments that permit the
practice of torture, and none are being modified to do so. Furthermore,
all of the instruments that prohibit the practice do so absolutely. Hence,
the prohibition of torture is a jus cogens norm. Determining that the
prohibition of torture is ajus cogens norm is not enough, however, and
the inquiry must not end here. The question that necessarily follows is
should torture be such a violation. To satisfy this inquiry, Part IV
discusses and analyzes the main three competing views.
IV. Where Legality & Morality Meet: Should Torture Be
Treated as Violation of International Law?-Three Views
A democratic, freedom-loving society does not accept that investigators
use any means for the purposes of uncovering the truth ... At times, the
price of truth is so high that a democratic society is not prepared to pay
it. 138
4.1 Torture Is Not a Violation of Customary International
Law or Jus Cogens Norms, Nor Should It Be
The first view is held by those who believe that the prohibition
of torture is not and should not be a violation ofjus cogens norms. One
of the most compelling proponents of this view is Mark Weisburd,
Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. In
his article, Customary International Law and Torture: The Case of India,
3' H.C. 5100/94, Public Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Israel, 53(4) P.D.
817, 38 I.L.M. 1471, 1481 (Isr. 1999) (citing Barak, On Law, Judging and
Truth, in 27 Mishpatim 11, at 13), available at
http://62.90.71.124/files eng/94/000/051/a09/94051000.a09.pdf (last visited
Feb. 21, 2005) [hereinafter Public Committee Against Torture]. All future
references to page numbers for this case refer to the page number of the case in
.pdf format as displayed on the website listed above).
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Professor Weisburd concludes that the prohibition against torture is not a
violation of customary international law, nor should it be.' 39 Instead, he
reasons that since customary international law is defined as the repetitive
practices of states that eventually becomes accepted as law, and because
torture is a widespread problem, no one can accurately assert "that the
general practice of states [is] to refrain from torture."'' 40  Weisburd
further contends that "[w]hether a given act counts as 'practice' should
depend on whether that act will generate expectations regarding future
acts." 141 To support his argument, Weisburd uses India as a case
study.142  The remainder of this section sets forth and analyzes
Weisburd's primary arguments.
A. India: A Case Study for the Proposition that Torture
Does Not Violate Jus Cogens Norms
1. Indian Law & the Practice of Torture
Indian domestic law prohibits the use of torture as well as any
evidence obtained through torture. 143 The penal code expressly provides
for the prosecution of state agents convicted of resorting to torture. 144
India is also a party to the ICCPR, which expressly prohibits torture.1 45
Notwithstanding these laws, the practice is prevalent.
The overall picture for India with regard to torture is not
good. Although its internal law has been interpreted as
forbidding torture-and in fact contains provisions
139 Weisburd, supra note 13.
140 Id. at 82.
1411d. at 91.
142 Id. Weisburd uses India for a case study because the country counts for
about one-sixth of the total global population and because torture is a commonly
employed penal sanction. Id. at 89.
141 Id. at 83. Article 14 of the Indian Constitution does not expressly prohibit the
practice of torture. Instead it provides that "[tihe State shall not deny to any
person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the
territory of India." Id. Article 21 provides: "No person shall be deprived of his
life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law." Id.
In Mullin v. Union Territory of Delhi, the Indian Supreme Court held that any
form of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment would violates Arts. 14
and 21 of the Indian Constitution. AIR 1981 SC 746.
144 Weisburd, supra note 13, at 83.
141 Id. at 84.
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aimed at preventing it, these provisions are not enforced,
and their effect is lessened by the operation of other
enactments. In fact, police torture is common. Most
disturbingly, those instances of torture, which come to
light, seem to evoke little reaction from the top levels of
the Indian government .... 1
46
The most common methods of torture include, but are not
limited to: "beating[s], rape, crushing the leg muscles with a wooden
roller, burning with heated objects, and electric shock."'147
2. India as an Example of Why Torture Is Not and
Should Not Be a Violation of Jus Cogens Norms
under Customary International Law-Three
Arguments
Using India as the quintessential case study, Weisburd articulates
three arguments in an attempt to explain why torture should not be, and
perhaps is not, a part of customary international law.
a. Prohibiting Torture Jeopardizes Diplomatic
Relations
First, Weisburd argues there is no logical reason why torture or
any other putative human rights violations should be catapulted above all
other laws, or why any states dealing with India should refrain from
establishing diplomatic relations because of unrelated human rights
violations. States that do so risk "engendering a degree of resentment
and suspicion strong enough to weaken its ability to work with the Indian
government to moderate threats to peace."' 4
8
b. Eradicating Torture Places an Unreasonable
Burden on India
Second, Weisburd argues that since the practice of torture is
widespread and ingrained in India's police culture, eradicating the
practice would place an unreasonable burden on the government by
forcing India to completely restructure its laws. He argues that the
146 Id. at 87.
141 Id. at 83.
141 Id. at 94.
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international community has no right-legal or otherwise-to demand
that a state burden itself to with such an awesome task.
49
c. Demanding that States Refrain from Torture Is
International and Cultural Imperialism
Weisburd's third argument is the most disconcerting and
dangerous because he contends imposing a prohibition against torture on
individual states, such as India, is the functional equivalent of
international' 50 and cultural' 5 ' imperialism. Weisburd reasons that since
torture is common in India, no one can claim that the general population
is unaware of the problem. If the majority of people want to eradicate
the practice, they can do so at the next election. However, "[t]o insist
that international law nonetheless obligates India to eliminate this
practice, then, amounts to substituting the judgment of the international
community for that of the Indian electorate."']
52
B. Analysis: Reconciling the Inconsistencies
1. Customary Law, Jus Cogens Norms and State
Practices
The prohibition against torture originates from long-standing
natural and positive law concepts. 153 Accordingly, customary and jus
149 Id. at 94-95.
10 Id at 96-97. Weisburd does not qualify or define the term "international
imperialism." Instead, he analogizes 19th century imperialists to modem day
human rights advocates: "[Ilmeprialists frequently sought to justify their
subordination of other peoples by reference to the superiority of values the
imperialist would place... Given India's democratic character, it seems accurate
to analogize to imperialism any efforts to force India into placing more weight
on eliminating torture. .. ." Id at 97.
'5' Id. at 96-97 ("To phrase the problem in cultural terms is to delve into the
difference of how the values of a particular culture, and what weight is to be
given to the possibility of change over time in a cultural.").
152 Id. at 96-97. Weisburd also argues that "[a] side from its imperialistic
character, a demand backed by coercion that the Indian government place
greater weight than it has on the importance of eradicating torture seems
paradoxically inconsistent with the basic rationales for the international law of
human rights." Id. at 97.
153 According to the doctrine of natural law, all human beings have inalienable
rights simply because they are human beings; no other explanation or
justification is needed. These rights are so basic to humanity as a whole that
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cogens norms are as much about humanity and morality as they are about
states' actual practices and the rule of law. They are assertions of
universally recognized rights and freedoms. They function as
international legal codifications regulating states' behavior with respect
to each other and the international community as a whole. This is
necessary for international stability. Hence, while it is true that many
states within the international community either practice or permit
torture, this reality in no way denigrates the ultimate aim of the
international community: to eradicate the practice-or at least reduce the
growing number of cases. By narrowly construing the definition of
customary international law, Weisburd isolates it from its origins and
ignores the relevance of such norms altogether. International law should
not reverse its position because some states resort to the practice.
Instead, it must continue to work for its eradication, sending a clear,
consistent message that such practices are intolerable.
2. The Prohibition against Torture should not Cause a
Rift in Diplomatic Relations Between States
Weisburd contends that there is no reason "other states ought to
make India's human rights record the focus of their dealings with
India."'154 Doing so, he argues, shifts the focus from more important
issues, like the threat of a possible nuclear war between India and
Pakistan. Weisburd is correct in assuming that the international
community has a strong interest in reducing tension between the two
states, thereby reducing the threat of a nuclear war. However, he
erroneously concludes that positive diplomatic relationships can or
should be maintained at all costs. Following Weisburd's lines of
they cannot be stripped away by any human or institution. Because certain
rights cannot be abrogated by anyone or anything, the doctrine of natural law
necessarily holds a state accountable for its actions if it repeatedly violates the
most basic human rights of those it has a duty to protect. The doctrine of
positive law emerged out of a need to codify some of the natural law norms as
well as regulate the behavior of the newly emerging states. Prohibitions against
piracy, slavery /slave trading, and initiating aggressive wars were the result of
states recognizing that humanity, history and morality could not be isolated from
the rule of law, that at some point each will guide the other. At times, these
components may seem like strange bedfellows; but nevertheless, they are. The
prohibition against torture can be deemed one of the offspring of such a
relationship. See generally HANNIKAINEN, supra note 71.
154 Weisburd, supra note 13, at 94.
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reasoning, the international community should have allowed slavery and
slave trading to continue and ignored the holocaust in Germany that
prompted WWII. In an attempt to make a point, Weisburd completely
misses the point. It is because the practice of torture is endemic that the
prohibition against it and other grave human rights violations deserves
and receives so much attention, not the opposite.
3. Uprooting the Practice and Restructuring the
Government is not an Unreasonable Burden to
Impose upon a State
India already has laws in place (contained in statutes and cases)
that prohibit the practice of torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment or punishment. India is also signatory to the ICCPR, which
prohibits torture. Hence, the government's task is not overly
burdensome. There is certainly no need to restructure the entire legal
system when valid laws already exist. What India must do is enforce its
laws and amend or repeal those that grant "blanket immunity" to police
officers who violate individual's human rights. India should also
properly train (or re-train) its police officers, emphasizing the advantages
of conducting interrogations without resorting to physical violence.
During training, officers should be taught that the use physical force
against an unarmed detainee is never justified. Officers should also be
notified that anyone who resorts to physical force will be dismissed
(without pay) and duly prosecuted under the criminal codes. Properly
training police officers reduces the likelihood that torture will remain
ingrained in the police culture. By fulfilling its domestic obligations,
India would also be fulfilling its international obligations.
4. Demanding a State Reconcile Its Domestic Law with
International Law is Not the Functional Equivalent
of International or Cultural Imperialism
Weisburd's attempt to draw parallels between the international
community's response to the practice of torture with cultural and
international imperialism1" is unpersuasive. So too is his solution of
letting the voters decide. As ingenious as this argument appears on its
face, it lacks any real substance with respect to the prohibition of torture
as it fails to distinguish between theory and reality.
"' Id. at 96-97.
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Weisburd's argument fails to account for the numerous
occasions where the public at-large is intentionally manipulated, 56 and
deceived by their government. In theory, voters are intelligent and
knowledgeable; they make conscientious, well-reasoned decisions at the
polls. In reality, many voters cast their votes based on misinformation
deliberately fed or filtered to them from their government. Because
torture is strictly prohibited under international law, 57 states go to great
lengths to hide the practice from the general public. 58 While the public
at-large may know police officers get "rough," they may be completely
unaware of the extent of the problem. This could explain the absence of
protest.
Weisburd's argument also fails to consider the number or class
of voters that may be excluded from voting on the issue. In the United
States, convicted felons lose, among other rights, the right to vote. If a
tortured suspect is convicted of the crime for which he was detained, he
or she may lose his right to vote, thereby muting his or her protest on an
issue that directly affects him or her. Put another way, classes directly
affected by officers' non-compliance with domestic and international
laws have no standing to challenge the officers and have no standing to
hold their state accountable if it fails to protect them.
Last, it is worth remembering that India was not forced to sign
the ICCPR and thereby agree to be bound by its provisions. This is the
most significant difference between nineteenth century imperialism and
modem day international human rights. States bound by international
156 See generally Timothy L. Thomas, The Age of the New Persuaders, MIL.
REV., May-June 1997, at 72. Thomas defines manipulation as "the desired goal
or result of a process that utilizes devices (semantic, technical, psychological,
behavioral, etc.) to deceive, misinform, persuade, or control an object, either
concrete (a person, state, or action) or abstract (thinking, perceptions, etc.)
usually to gain one an advantage." Id.
157 ChimiMe Keitner, Crafting the International Criminal Court: Trials and
Tribulations in Article 98(2), 6 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 215, 224-225
(2001) ("It is clear under the current state of international law that certain
heinous actions [such as torture] cannot form a legitimate part of state policy or
benefit from the protection generally accorded to official acts of the state.")
158 Often, a suspect is held incommunicado, interrogated, and denied the right to
communicate with anyone off-site. If the detainee does not die as a result of the
bodily assaults, authorities may attempt to ensure his silence by threatening to
torture him again or by threatening the lives of his loved ones. Upon release, the
suspect may be instructed not to discuss his experience with anyone. The
suspect obeys these orders out of fear.
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covenants or treaties should not cry cultural or international imperialism
when asked not to violate the very articles they agreed to uphold.
4.2 Torture Is a Violation of International Law but Should Be
Permitted in Exigent Circumstances
A. The Dershowitzan Solution: Limited Legal Torture
The second view is articulated best by Harvard Law Professor
Alan Dershowitz, who acknowledges that the practice of torture is not
only morally reprehensible but is also a violation of both U.S. and
international law. He even admits that legalizing torture is a "'slippery
slope"' 159 and "'too dangerous."", 160 Nevertheless, he contends there are
circumstances where the practice can be justified, namely in the case of a
"ticking time bomb" terrorist-that is, "a situation where thousands of
lives are at stake and [the authorities can] prevent those lives being lost
by causing pain to a clear, admitted terrorist . ... 161 Reduced to its
elements, Dershowitz's argument for the legalization of torture is
unexpectedly simple: because torture is already being practiced in the
United States and abroad, we should just legalize the practice and do it
openly.162 Under the Dershowitzan model, legal torture is preferred over
the current trend of "'secrecy with deniability ' '" 163 for four main reasons:
(1) it will force judges to "'sign a warrant authorizing torture with
accountability'"; 164 (2) it will reduce "the amount of physical violence
directed against suspects";165 and thus, (3) better protect suspected
159 James Silver, Why America's Top Liberal Lawyer Wants to Legalise Torture,
SCOTSMAN, May 22, 2004, at http://news.scotsman.com/archive.cfrn?id=5826
62004 (last visited Feb. 20, 2005) (quoting Prof. Dershowitz as stating: "I'm
personally opposed to torture because I think the slippery slope is too steep and
too dangerous.").
160 id.
161 Id.
162 Interview by Wolf Blitzer with Alan Dershowitz, Harvard University Law
Professor, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/03/03/cnna.Dershowitz/index.
html (last visited Feb. 20, 2005) (posting a transcription of the interview, with
the title "Dershowitz: Torture could be Justified").
163 Silver, supra note 159 (quoting Professor Dershowitz).
164 Gewertz, supra note 2 (quoting Professor Dershowitz).
165 Alan Dershowitz, When All Else Fails, Why Not Torture?, AM. LEGION
MAG., July 2002. Professor Dershowitz, further writes: "Judges would require
compelling evidence before they would authorize so extraordinary a departure
from our constitutional norms, and law enforcement officials would be reluctant
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terrorists' rights; 166 and (4) it may prevent the senseless death of
thousands of civilians.
When asked about permissible methods of torture, Dershowitz
prefaced his response by stating that torture is a continuum. At one end,
there is torture as a deterrent. This entails torturing someone to death to
send a message to others that they will suffer the same fate, if caught. At
the other end of the spectrum, there is "'non-lethal torture which leaves
only psychological scars.', 1 67  Dershowitz opts for the latter-the
methods of which include, but are not limited to pushing a sterilized
needle under a suspect's fingernails, causing excruciating, short-term
pain 16 and injecting the suspect with a cocktail of drugs, affectionately
known as "truth serum. 169 In closing one of his articles on legalizing
to seek a warrant unless they had compelling evidence that the suspect had
information needed to prevent an imminent terrorist attack."
166 Id. ("He or she would be offered immunity to provide the requested
information or threatened with torture and imprisonment. Knowing such a
threat was authorized by law, the suspect might well provide the information.").
To support this claim, Dershowitz refers to a kidnapping that took place in
Germany, in which the son of a well-known financier was kidnapped and "the
police were given the authority to torture the kidnapper in order to coerce him to
disclose the whereabouts of the boy. Once the kidnapper found out that torture
had been authorized, he immediately came clean. Tragically, the police arrived
to find that the boy had died." Silver, supra note 159. Arguably, this case
contradicts Dershowitz arguments, as it exemplifies the uselessness of suspect's
tortured confession. Despite the torture, the child was not spared.
167 Id. (quoting Professor Dershowitz).
168 id.
169 Alan Dershowitz, Comentary: Is There a Torturous Road to Justice?, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 11, 2001, at B19. See Kevin Johnson & Richard Willings, Ex-CIA
Chief Revitalizes "Truth Serum" Debate, USA TODAY, April 26, 2002. Truth
serum
is a barbiturate called thiopental sodium, better known as
Sodium Pentothal, trademark of Abbott Laboratories. It is a
yellow crystal that can be dissolved in water or alcohol and
administered orally or intravenously. Sodium Pentothal is used
as a sedative and as an anesthetic during surgery. It depresses
the central nervous system, slows the heart rate and lowers the
blood pressure. Patients on whom the drug is used as an
anesthetic usually are unconscious less than a minute after it
enters their veins. The drug causes only a few minutes of
sedation. Because of its effectiveness as a sedative, it is the
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torture, Dershowitz implies that he is forced to support the legalization of
torture because to not do so-to be unprepared-is to invite torture with
impunity.
170
B. Analysis of the Dershowitzan Model
1. Counter-Arguments
Dershowitz's contentions that state-sanctioned, judicially
monitored torture will result in a more transparent process, forcing
judges (and law enforcement in general) to be more accountable; that it
will reduce police brutality against terror suspects; that it will better
protect suspected terrorists' rights; and that it will save the loss of
innocent lives, all lack merit. Below, each proposition is rebutted in
turn.
a. Torture Cannot be Judicially-Monitored; Lack of
Accountability and Transparency
Dershowitz argues that torture can and should be judicially
monitored. He speaks of a hypothetical world where judges and
magistrates are held accountable if they erroneously issue torture
warrants. Unfortunately, his hypothetical world cannot be reconciled
with current U.S. jurisprudence, which holds that a judge cannot be held
responsible for any adverse consequences that directly or indirectly flow
from a reasonable decision, and that decisions may only be reversed if it
is clear from the record that a judge abused his discretion or made some
other reversible error as a matter of law.17 1
first of three drugs used by U.S. prison systems during
executions. In milder doses, the drug becomes what some call
a "truth serum." Those taking the drug become very
communicative and share their thoughts without hesitation.
Despite its nickname, Sodium Pentothal will not make a
person tell the truth against his will. The recipient likely will
lose his inhibition, and therefore he might be more likely to
tell the truth.
Id
170 Dershowitz, supra note 165.
171 Justice Cardozo characterized the issue of suppressing evidence obtained
through a defective warrant as an issue of whether "the criminal is to go free
because the constable has blundered." People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E.
585 (1926). Examples of these blunders are found in Franks v. Deleware, 438
U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978) (finding a warrant invalid
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To understand the implications of these rules, consider the
following: An officer, believing the suspect he has arrested has crucial
information yet lacking evidence to prove his belief, deliberately
misstates the facts or flat out lies to obtain a warrant to torture. The
judge, reading the officer's false affidavit, issues a warrant. Later, it is
discovered that the officer lied. Although the judge acted in good faith
based on the officer's swom affidavit, 17 the warrant was bogus. In this
simple scenario, which closely mirrors modem day realities, one
officer's lie convolutes the entire process, and a man is forced to endure
excruciating pain based on nothing more than one man's suspicion that
his detainee has pertinent information. In real life, as in this scenario,
neither the issuance of the torture warrant nor the administration of
torture is transparent. Even more disconcerting is the total lack of
accountability. This unjust outcome, though unintended, is not only
foreseeable, but an inevitable consequence of trying to distinguish
between one torturous act and another. The best way to prevent such
irreversible conduct is to continue to prohibit the practice altogether.
b. Legal Torture Will Not Reduce Physical Violence
Against A Suspected Terrorist
Dershowitz's claim that legal torture will reduce the amount of
physical violence police might otherwise direct at suspected terrorists is
unpersuasive, especially given the fact that torture cannot, as pointed out
where it can be proven that the evidence given to the magistrate was false or
deliberately reckless); Lo-Ji Sale, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 99 S. Ct.
2319, 60 L. Ed. 2d 920 (1979) (unanimous) (invalidating a warrant issued when
the judge left his detached and neutral role and participated in the police
investigation); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527
(1983) (stating that ratification of "bare bones" conclusions in an affidavit is
improper). The standard for reversing a magistrate's issuance of a warrant is
deferential and looks to see whether the magistrate had a "substantial basis for..
• conclud[ing] that a search would uncover evidence of the wrongdoing." Gates,
462 U.S. at 236-37, 103 S. Ct. at 2331. Further, caselaw now analyzes the
deterrence effect that the exclusion of evidence seized through a defective
warrant would have on the police, admitting that there is no deterrence effect
upon the judge. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L.
Ed. 2d 677 (1984). This current state of caselaw reflects the lack of
accountability that judges currently face.
172 See Id., where U.S. Supreme Court held the exclusionary rule does not bar
admission of evidence seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance on a search
warrant that was subsequently held to be defective.
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above, be judicially-monitored. An officer using permissible methods,
but not successfully obtaining the information sought, may resort to
impermissible methods out of sheer frustration, pressure, or anger. 73
Ironically, one of the best examples of such an impermissible extension
of legality is discussed by Dershowitz himself during an interview when
he referred to a 1980s Jordanian case; interrogators, frustrated with their
unusually stubborn detainee called in the suspect's mother and child and
tortured them, all in an effort to get the detainee to talk.
74
If the history of torture teaches us anything, it is that "there is no
such thing as a 'little bit' of physical pressure .... Once a degree of
force is permitted, interrogators face an overwhelming temptation to
continue applying as much force as necessary to acquire the sought-for
information.', 175 This is a fact that not even Dershowitz can ignore.1
76
Hence, there is no support for the proposition that legalizing torture will
reduce police brutality against detained terrorist suspects.
c. Legal Torture Will Not Better Protect Suspected
Terrorists' Rights
Equally unpersuasive is Dershowitz's assertion that permitting
certain types of torture will better protect suspected terrorists' rights.
Dershowitz reasons that because the U.S. Supreme Court has held that
once immunity is offered a suspect can be compelled to disclose the
requested information, a suspected terrorist will have two choices:
disclose the relevant information and receive immunity, or face torture.
Dershowitz seems to forget, however, that the right against self
incrimination "do[es] not in any sense permit violations of the separate
right to be free of torture. Torture is never permitted to overcome a
witness's desire to remain silent."'
177
173 Human Rights Watch, The Legal Prohibition Against Torture, at
http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/ll/TortureQandA.htm (last visited Feb. 20,
2005) ("Although such an exception might appear to be highly limited,
experience shows that the exception readily becomes the standard practice.").
174 Silver, supra note 159.
175 Human Rights Watch, supra note 173.
176 See Seth Finkelstein, Alan Dershowitz's Tortuous Torturous Argument,
ETHICAL SPECTACLE, Feb. 2002, at http://www.spectacle.org/0202/seth.html
(last visited Feb. 20, 2005) (quoting Dershowitz as stating, "We know from
experience that law enforcement personnel who are given limited authority to
torture will expand its use.").
177 Human Rights Watch, supra note 173.
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Moreover, the immunity rule assumes that the main reason a
defendant refuses to speak is because he fears that by inculpating himself
he will be held criminally liable for his conduct. When the government
grants immunity to a defendant, it removes the defendant's main
incentive for remaining silent. Put another way, when immunity is
offered, it is assumed that the defendant no longer possess a legitimate
reason for withholding the information sought by the government. The
problem here, however, lies not in the fact that a suspect can be granted
immunity and compelled to talk, but in the fact that most, if not all,
terrorist suspects will still refuse to talk. Dershowitz also ignores other
U.S. Supreme Court cases that hold that some of the rights and freedoms
applicable to U.S. citizens do not necessarily extend to foreign
defendants, especially those listed as enemy combatants and captured on
foreign soil. 17a Thus, it is misleading to even imply that a suspected
terrorist will have a choice between disclosure-confession and immunity.
At the end of the day, suspected terrorists rights are better
protected by laws that clearly define and restrict police power, not by
laws that leave room for broad discretion and abuse.
178 See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 70 S. Ct. 936, 94 L. Ed. 1255
(1950), where twenty-one German nationals were convicted of engaging in
continued military activity against the United States after the surrender of
Germany but before the surrender of Japan during WWII. The Court held that
enemy aliens, arrested in China and imprisoned in Germany after WWII, could
not obtain a writ of habeas corpus. And although the Court recognized certain
constitutional provisions, it flatly rejected an extraterritorial application of the
Fifth Amendment and immunity: "The Constitution does not confer a right of
personal security or immunity from military trial and punishment upon an alien
enemy engaged in the hostile service of a government at war with the United
States." Johnson, 339 U.S. at 785, 70 S. Ct. at 947. See also Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 72 L. Ed. 2d 786 (1982). Here, the Supreme Court
held that aliens may receive constitutional protections only if they (i) come
within the territory and (ii) establish substantial ties with the United States.
Given the Johnson holding, it is doubtful that United States will grant foreign
terrorists any of the privileges or rights guaranteed to American citizens by
virtue of the U.S. Constitution. Also, recall that the United States has been
accused of exporting and deporting alleged terrorists to states that are not bound
by the U.S. Constitution and are infamous for their poor observance of human
rights. See also Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.
Ed. 2d 212 (1972) (describing the outer limits of immunity in the context of
derivative use testimony); 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 6001-05 (addressing the use of
immunity by the U.S. government).
2004]
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv.
d. Legal Torture Will Not Prevent the Loss of
Innocent Lives
Dershowitz's argument that the legalization of torture will
prevent the loss of innocent lives is meritless, as it is based on false
assumptions and contradicted by volumes of evidence. Specifically, the
argument assumes that the person being detained and tortured actually
knows the information sought by law enforcement. The argument
further assumes that a suspect will tell the truth because he is being
tortured, while not assuming that he would lie just to stop the torture.
Indeed, even the "most seasoned interrogators recognize that torture is
not only immoral and illegal, but ineffective and unnecessary as well.
Given that people being tortured will say anything to stop the pain, the
information yielded from torture is often false or of dubious
reliability."'7 9 In short, legalizing torture will not ensure that thousands
of lives are spared if there is another attack. Instead, it casts doubt on the
reliability of the information gained and the legitimacy of the entire legal
system.
2. Illegality of the Method Proposed
a. Causing Excruciating Pain, Inserting Needles
under Fingernails
Neither domestic law nor international law recognizes a
distinction between what Dershowitz refers to as "deterrent" torture and
"non-lethal" torture. Torture is prohibited because it causes excruciating
pain. Accordingly, all of the methods Dershowitz proposes have been
rejected as either unconstitutional under domestic law or criminal under
international law. Recall the 1960 Wickersham Report. 80 It concluded
that the practice of injecting a sterilized needle under an inmate's
fingernails constituted a form of torture and thus was impermissible.
b. Use of Truth Serums
U.S. courts have also rejected the use of "truth serums" in
custodial interrogations. In 1963, the Ninth Circuit prohibited the use of
truth serum during custodial interrogations.'18 In affirming the lower
court's decision, the Court rejected the government's argument that such
179 Human Rights Watch, supra note 173.
180See supra pp 311-12.
'81 See Lindsey v. United States, 237 F.2d 893 (1956).
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injections did not violate the Constitution. The Court, citing its own
research, expressed concern over the fact that there was no concrete,
scientific evidence that truth serums even work.182  Many medical
experts argue that the personality of the suspect has more influence on
the truth serum than the truth serum on the suspect. The Lindsey court
agreed when it quoted from a Yale Law Journal article addressing the
effects of truth serum on confessions:
In summary, experimental and clinical findings indicate
that only individuals who have conscious and
unconscious reasons for doing so are inclined to confess
and yield to interrogation under drug influence. On the
other hand, some are able to withhold information and
some, especially character neurotics, are able to lie.
Others are so suggestible they will describe, in response
to suggestive questioning, behavior which never in fact
occurred .... [Drugs] lessen inhibitions to verbalization
and stimulate unrepressed expression not only of fact but
of fancy and suggestion as well.183
3. Legal Torture as an Impermissible Extension of
Legality by Analogy
In the final analysis, Dershowitz's argument for the legalization
of torture is an impermissible extension of the principle of legality by
analogy, which becomes clearer by analogy when we substitute another
prohibited act in its place-for example, interrogational murders.
Following Dershowitz's line of reasoning, interrogational murders
should be permitted, despite laws prohibiting intentional murder. Instead
of condemning the unlawful conduct, Dershowitz attempts to resolve the
182 In Lindsey, the Court held that it was reversible error for a lower court to
admit tape recording of a sodium-pentothal-induced interview between a
psychiatrist and a prosecution witness, even as evidence of prior consistent
statements for the limited purpose of rehabilitating an impeached witness. The
Court stated that in order to accept the Government's view, they would have to
believe that truth serum really makes one tell the truth, that the serum was
trustworthy and reliable. The Court was unwilling accept such a view, citing a
plethora of cases and medical studies that contradicted the State's position.
Lindsey, 237 F.2d at 896-97..
183 Lindsey, 237 F.2d at 896. (citing Dession et al., Drug Induced Revelation and
Criminal Investigation, 62 YALE L.J. 315, 319 (1953)).
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conflict between the rule of law and the prohibition against torture by
changing the rule of law to accommodate torture while simultaneously
proclaiming that torture qua torture is extra-judicial (i.e., illegal).
If torture is illegal, then, by definition, it's operating
outside the law. So if a torture warrant is created,
obviously torture with [a] warrant would be within the
law. . . . Torture doesn't comply with the rule of law
because it is against the law. If the law is changed so
that torture is permitted (with [a] warrant), then it's [sic]
only become compliant with the rule of law because that
rule has been changed.184
To change the law under Dershowitz's reasoning is tantamount
to conceding that the terrorists have won. No democracy can afford to
make such concession.
4.3 Torture Is and Should Always Be a Violation of Customary
International Law & Jus Cogens Norms
Analysis of the third view focuses on the state of Israel, where
daily terrorist attacks have prompted the government there to legalize
torture, 185 as well on as a 1999 landmark decision that prohibited use of
torture and other cruel, inhumane and degrading methods of
interrogation.
184 Finkelstein, supra note 176.
185 Public Committee Against Torture, supra note 138, at 34.
Ever since it was established, the state of Israel has been
engaged in an unceasing struggle for both its very existence
and security-indeed its very existence. Terrorist
organizations have set Israel's annihilation as their goal....
The facts before this Court reveal that 121 people died in
terrorist attacks between January 1, 1996 and May 14, 1998.
Seven hundred and seven people were injured. A large
number of those killed and injured were victims of harrowing
suicide bombings in the heart of Israel's cities.
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A. Public Committee Against Torture
1. Background to the Case
In 1968, the Landau Commission drafted "operational code"
guidelines'8 6 that authorized the General Secret Service (GSS) 187 to
investigate suspected terrorists and, when necessary, to use moderate
physical force in the absence of expressed statutory authority. The
Commission stated that by way of the "necessity" defense those officers
who felt it necessary to resort to physical force during an interrogation
would be immune from prosecution.18 When the Landau Commission
released its report in 1987,189 these operational code guidelines for GSS
investigators were quickly seen for what they were: "'unwritten
conventions which permitted the GSS to use force while interrogating
suspected terrorists and later to deny it in courts, thereby protecting the
'myth system' of legality.""' 190
As a result, several individuals filed petitions challenging the
legitimacy of the operational code, claiming the methods employed by
the GSS constituted illegal torture. In two cases, the "petitioner had
confessed to being a terrorist, [a] member of the extreme Islamic Jihad
group, and [aroused] the GSS's substantiated suspicion that the detainee
had extremely vital information which, if procured, could save human
lives."'' This is an example of the "ticking time bomb" scenario
186 Eyal Benvenisti, The Role of National Courts in Preventing Torture of
Suspected Terrorists, 8 EUR. J. INT'L L. 596 (1997), available at
http://www.ejil.org/joumal/Vol8/No4/art4.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2005). All
future references to page numbers for this article refer to the page number of the
article in .pdf format as displayed on the website listed above.
187 GSS officers are responsible for fighting terrorism. They investigate
individuals and groups suspected of terrorist activities. Id. at 1.
188 Id. The "necessity" defense is an affirmative defense found in Article 34(J)
of the Israel Penal Law. It provides that "'[a] person will not bear criminal
liability for committing any act immediately necessary for the purpose of saving
life, liberty, body, or property, of either himself or his fellow person, from
substantial danger of serious harm, imminent from the particular state of things,
at the requisite timing, and absent alternative means for avoiding the harm."' Id.
at 8 (citing art. 34(J) of the Israel Penal Code as translated in 30 ISR. L. REv. 171
(1996)).
18 9 Id at 1.
190 Id. (quoting W. M. REIsMAN, FOLDED LIES: BRIBERY, CRUSADES, AND
REFORMS ch. 1 (1979)).
191 Id. at 2 (internal citation omitted).
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Dershowitz refers to in his articles and interviews. On at least three
occasions, the Court permitted the GSS to continue interrogating
suspects until it could reach a decision on the merits.
19 2
In the 1996 Mubarak case,193 the Israeli High Court Justice had
the opportunity to look beyond the necessity defense offered by the state
and to determine if the specific methods at issue constituted torture in
violation of international law. The methods at issue are delineated and
described below.
2. Methods Used by the GSS During Interrogation194
Shaking: 195 This method involves "forcefully shaking a
suspect's upper torso back and forth until it causes the neck and
head to dangle and vacillate rapidly." Shaking can cause serious
damage to the brain and spinal cord, loss of consciousness,
uncontrollable vomiting and urinating, serious headaches, and
sometimes death.
The "Shabach" Position: 196 Suspects are seated in a small, low
chair. The seat is tilted forward towards the floor. One of the
suspect's hands is tied behind the chair, while the other hand is
placed between the gaps in the chair's back support. The
suspect's head is covered with a sack. Incredibly loud music is
played before, during, and after interrogations. The "Shabach"
position causes serious pain in the arms and neck and chronic
headaches.
The "Frog Crouch" Position: 197 One is made to perform
"consecutive, periodical crouches on the tips of one's toes, each
lasting for five-minute intervals."
192 i/d.
193 H.C. 3124, Mubarak v. The General Security Service (Isr. 1996)
(unpublished).
194 Public Committee Against Torture, supra note 138, at 8-11. Note that all of
the descriptions contained within this section above are found in the Court's
decision. The Court's exact wording can be identified by quotation marks.
195 Id. at 8
196Id at 9-10
197Id. at 10.
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Excessive Tightening of Hand and Foot Cuffs: 198 Officers
intentionally tighten hand and foot cuffs for extended periods of
time to induce pain. This method causes serious (sometimes
permanent) injuries to the suspect's hands, arms, and feet.
Sleep Deprivation: 199 Suspects are intentionally deprived of
sleep. The purpose of denying sleep is to "break" the suspect by
sheer exhaustion.
3. Petitioners' Arguments
The petitioners made two claims.200 First, they argued that the
GSS investigators lacked the authority to conduct the very interrogations
they were conducting. Second, the petitioners argued that even if the
Court found that GSS investigators were authorized to conduct
interrogations, the methods at issue constituted torture and were not only
criminal under domestic law but also prohibited under customary
international law. At one point during the case, the High Court asked the
Petitioners if they would reconsider their position if a "ticking time
bomb" situation arose. The Petitioners answered in the negative, stating
that "even if it is acceptable to employ physical means in the exceptional
circumstances of the "ticking time bomb," these methods are used even
in the absence of "ticking bomb" conditions. The very fact that the use
of such means is illegal in most cases warrants banning their use
altogether .... ,20 '
4. The State's Arguments
The State asserted the "necessity" defense and argued that GSS
investigators were authorized to interrogate terrorist suspects pursuant to
Article 40 of the Basic Law of 1992 and Article 2(1) of the Criminal
Procedure Statute.2°2 Regarding the methods used, the State argued that
Article 34(11) of the Penal Law expressly permits GSS officers to use
"moderate physical pressure. 20 3 The State reasoned that since the law
permits the use of physical pressure, the methods used, as a matter of
198 1d. at 10-11.
'99 Id. at 11.
20°Id. at 11-12
20° Id. at 12.
202 Id. at 12.
203 Id. at 13
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law, could never amount to torture.204 It also claimed that the methods in
question were only employed as a last resort and were supervised under
the strictest of conditions, as set forth in the Landau Inquiry Report.20 5 In
sum, the state argued that there was no violation of domestic law and no
violation of international law.
5. The Court's Holding and Rationale
a. Authority to Interrogate
In order for the conduct of an agent of the state to be lawful,
there must a statute that authorizes such conduct.20 6 If the state agent
cannot find such authority and he proceeds, he is acting ultra vires.2 °7
GSS investigators' authority to interrogate is found in Article 2(1) of the
Criminal Procedure Statute, which generally prescribes (and arguably
limits) the scope of police power. 208 As such, the Court held that GSS
investigators were authorized to interrogate.2°9
b. Purpose of an Interrogation
The Court explained that interrogations must be carried out in
,,210accord with the "basic principles of [a] democratic regime. Within
democracy, there must be a balance between the protections given to
people and the need for security.21 In light of this, the "legality of an
investigation is deduced from the propriety of its purpose and from its
,212methods." An improper, illegal interrogation not only "harms the
suspect's human dignity," it also effects equally as great harms on
society.2i3 The Court thus found that some interrogation techniques will
be found to be unreasonable in certain circumstances.21 4 "There is a
prohibition on the use of 'brutal or inhuman means' in the course of an
investigation," the Court concluded. 15
204 Id.
205 Id.
206Id. at 16-17.
10 7 Id. at 16.
201 Id. at 19.
209 Id. at 20.
210 Id. at21.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 24.
21 Id. at 22.
214 Id. at 24.
215 Id at 23 (internal citation omitted).
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c. Legitimacy of Methods: The "Reasonable
Interrogation" Test
To determine if the methods used by GSS investigators were
legal, the Court began with the premise that any investigation carried out
by state agents must be reasonable, and thus must be able to pass the
"reasonable interrogation test." 216 This test involves balancing the need
to preserve the "'human image"' of the suspect and to preserve the
"'purity of arms"' used during the interrogation, 21 7 against the "need to
fight crime in general, and terrorist attacks in particular. 21 8  The
significance of the test lies not in the fact that it seeks to balance human
dignity and self-preservation, but in the fact that with respect to torture,
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment, there is no
balancing test to perform. "[A] reasonable interrogation is necessarily
one free of torture, free of cruel, inhuman treatment, and free of
degrading handling whatsoever." 2 1 9 The Court further stated that any
investigator who is found to have employed physical techniques to
extract information may be held criminally liable.22 °
d. Impermissibility of the Specific Methods
Employed
While the Court did not find that the methods employed against
the suspected terrorists constituted torture, it nevertheless held the
methods were impermissible on the grounds that they violated domestic
and international law. The "shaking" and "crouching" were prohibited
because neither method fulfills the purpose of a reasonable interrogation
and because the methods violate the suspect's right to be free from
physical harm and having his or her dignity impugned.22 The "Shabach"
position was given a more thorough examination because some of the
methods employed during the procedure are permissible, when used
alone.222 For example, a suspect may be handcuffed for the protection of
himself, others, or officers.223 However, cuffing a suspect's hand behind
216 Id. at22.
217 Id. (internal citation omitted).
2 18 id.
219 Id. at 23.
220 Id. To support this proposition, the Court cites to Israeli statutory law as well
as caselaw.22 1 Id. at 24.
222 Id. at 24-28.
223 Id. at 25.
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a chair in an uncomfortable position for hours solely to cause extreme
pain and discomfort cannot be justified.224 Also impermissible are the
practices of covering a suspect's head with a sack (even if the sack is
ventilated) and playing loud music non-stop. 225 The Court also held that
while some sleep deprivation will naturally occur during an
interrogation, when it "shifts from being a 'side effect' of the
interrogation, to an end in itself, 226 it is impermissible: "If the suspect is
intentionally deprived of sleep for a prolonged period of time, for the
purpose of tiring him out or 'breaking' him, it is not part of the scope of
a fair and reasonable investigation. 227
e. Applicability of the "Necessity Defense"
The High Court flatly rejected the State's argument that a
"necessity" defense should shield investigators who act outside the law
from criminal prosecution: "[T]he authority to establish directives
respecting the use of physical means during the course of a GSS
interrogation cannot be implied from the 'necessity defense.' 228  As
such, it cannot serve as a source of general administrative power.
229
More importantly, the Court makes it abundantly clear that even if
legislators were to de-criminalize the specific methods at issue, such
"lifting of criminal responsibility does not imply authorization to infringe
upon a human right. 23°
f. Infamous Dicta
Immediately after expressing their concern over the potential
abuse of the necessity defense, the Court informed the State they could
either appeal to the state legislature or assert "justification" 231 as an
affirmative defense. The inconsistency between the holding and the
dicta have left many confused, some angry.
224 Id.
2251d. at 26-27.
226 Id. at 29.
227 Id
228 Id. at 32.
229 Id at 34.
230 id.
231 Id. 34-35.
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B. Analysis of the Israeli High Court's Decision
The Israeli High Court has received both praise and criticism for
its disposition of this case. Praise comes from those who are satisfied
that the Court finally declared the methods at issue unlawful. Criticism,
on the other hand, comes from those who believe the Court should have
characterized the acts as torture and found the GSS investigators
criminally liable. This subsection analyzes the High Court's decision,
not by praising or criticizing the Court but, by going beyond the holdings
and dicta in an effort to isolate the Court's legal and moral position with
respect to the practice and prohibition of torture.
1. The Authority to Interrogate and the Purpose of
Interrogation
Consider, for example, the first issue resolved by the Court:
whether GSS investigators have the authority to interrogate suspected
terrorists. The significance of the disposition of this issue is found not in
what the Court held, but in what the Court refused to hold. The Court
could have held that because the guidelines were executive mandates and
the GSS investigators were acting in response to national security threats,
their methods, while morally reprehensive, were nonetheless permissible.
The Court could have declined to render a judgment, as it has done
previously, on the basis of institutional competence. Instead, the Court
restricted the scope of GSS interrogations, providing that all
interrogations be reasonable-in other words, an interrogation free of
torture.
2. The Prohibition of Torture as a Jus Cogens Norms
The Court acknowledged that the prohibition of torture is a jus
cogens norms and that Israel has an affirmative duty to respond to
allegations of state-sanctioned torture.232 In doing so, the Court rejected
Israel's "by any means necessary" response to terrorist activity, noting
that human rights issues, ignored by states, often become national
security issues. To reduce the chances of the two feeding off each other,
the rule of law and principles of democracy must be preserved.
This is the destiny of a democracy-it does not see all
means as acceptable, and the ways of its enemies are not
232 Id. at 23 (stating the prohibition of torture and inhumane treatment are "in
accord with international treaties, to which Israel is a signatory .. ").
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always open before it. A democracy must sometimes
fight with one hand tied behind its back. Even so, a
democracy has the upper hand. The rule of law liberty
of an individual constitute important components in its
understanding of security. At the end of the day, they
strengthen its spirit and this strength allows it to
overcome its difficulties.233
3. Reconciling the Holdings & Dicta
The Court's dicta make it clear that under certain circumstances
the necessity defense may shield an officer from criminal liability. The
Court also informed the State that it should petition legislators for
authorization to employ more drastic physical methods. Critics argue
that the Court's dicta are inconsistent with its opinion. However, a closer
examination of opinion fails to reveal any real conflicts between the
actual holdings and the infamous dicta.
First, there is nothing in the Court's opinion--dicta or
otherwise-which condones the practice of torture or of cruel, inhuman,
degrading treatment or punishment. The heavily criticized dicta did
nothing more than direct the State to the appropriate forum. Throughout
the case, the Court consistently states that the principles of democracy
must be protected at all costs; its suggestion to the State was merely in
furtherance of those democratic principles.
Critics should also take into account the precarious position of
the High Court and its judges. 234 The decisions rendered by the Israeli
High Court, like those rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court, are done
with the expectation that they will be enforced. Judges must rely on the
very law enforcement officers whose conduct its decisions directly
uphold, curtail, or expand. If the highest court of the land renders a
decision that it believes cannot or will not be enforced, what is
accomplished? While fearful that its decision might hamper
investigators' ability to properly deal the terrorism that plagues the
country, the Court remained faithful to the principles of democracy,
explaining that as judges and gatekeepers of democracy they have no
choice:
233 Id. at 37.
234 Id. ("We are, however part of Israeli society. Its problems are known to us
and we live its history. We are not isolated in an ivory tower. We live the life of
this country. We are aware of the harsh reality of terrorism in which we are, at
times, immersed.").
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Still, I the fear that the Court will appear to have
abandoned its proper role and to have descended into the
whirlwind of public debate; that its decision will be
acclaimed by certain segments of the public, while
others will reject it absolutely. It is in this sense that I
see myself as obligated to rule in accordance with the
law on any matter properly brought before the Court. I
am force to rule in accordance with the law, in complete
awareness that the public at large will not be interested
in the legal reasoning behind our decision, but rather in
our final result .... But what can we do, for this is our
role and our obligation as judges? 235
In this case, the Israeli High Court tasks' were two-fold. It had to
acknowledge the harsh realities that exist outside its doors while
simultaneously rejecting the "by any means necessary" defense offered
by the State. The Court's decision accomplished both tasks, and critics
should acknowledge this. Nothing in the Court's opinion suggest that it
would give deference to otherwise impermissible or illegal conduct,
especially if the conduct at issue, such as torture, violates international
law's absolute prohibition against the conduct.
V. Conclusion
Suddenly, stupor turns to despair: if patriotism has to precipitate us into
dishonor; if there is no precipice of inhumanity over which nations and
men will not throw themselves, then, why in fact do we go to so much
trouble to become, or to remain, human?
236
It is well settled under international law that the prohibition of
torture is ajus cogens norm and thus illegal. To better understand why
the practice of torture is illegal, one must ask the same question the
Israeli High Court of Justice asked before determining whether the
methods used by GSS investigators were legal: What purpose does the
act serve? Those who advocate for the legalization of torture argue that
the putative purpose is to gather information that could save lives. But,
235 Id. at 38 (quoting Deputy President Landau in H.C. 390/79, Dawikat v. Israel,
34(1) P.D. 1, 4).
236 PETERS, supra note 14, at 140 (quoting Jean-Paul Sartre).
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how can this purpose be a legitimate justification for state sanctioned
torture if it has been proven time and time again that torture is an
ineffective and unreliable interrogation tool?
In the United States, as in many other states, it is ineffective
method for another reason: evidence obtained by torture is inadmissible
in court. Thus, the only real purpose for torture is to terrorize, to cause
excruciating pain and discomfort, and to break a person's will. To these
ends, torture succeeds. One psychologist working with individuals who
have undergone political torture, describes a host of problems that result
from the practice:
Physical effects range from cognitive impairment to
decreased abilities to think, reason and remember ...
Psychological effects may include depressive and
anxiety disorders, intense and incessant nightmares and
"flashbacks" of the torture experiences, guilt and self-
hatred, frequent thoughts of suicide, the inability to form
and maintain meaningful relationships, severe
depression...237
If the main function of the state is to protect its people, then any
practice that results in the physical and mental injuries discussed in this
paper cannot be justified or tolerated. In a democracy, torture casts
doubt on the legitimacy of the entire system. Even more telling is the
history of torture and how its administrators have refined certain methods
and have a propensity to practice torture against an ever-expanding class
for an ever-expanding catalogue of offenses. Put another way, once
torture is legalized, no one-not even its supporters-are immune.
Today the torturable class may be terrorists; tomorrow it may expand to
include "hardcore" criminals; next week, maybe a neighbor; next year,
you. If we, as human beings, wish to continue to characterize ourselves
as "civilized," torture should never be legalized because it is the ultimate
act of incivility and the epitome of inhumanity.
237 Interview by Maina Tilton with Karen Hanscom, Ph.D., Advocates for
Survivors of Torture & Trauma, at http://www.astt.org/coharticle.htm (on file
with Author).
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